The Effectiveness of the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court : The Issue of Complementarity by Farbstein, Susan Hannah
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXERCISE  
OF JURISDICTION BY  
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  
THE ISSUE OF COMPLEMENTARITY  
 
Susan Hannah FARBSTEIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECMI Working Paper # 12 
 
August 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI) Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor Building) D-24939 Flensburg Germany 
( +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0   fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19   e-mail: info@ecmi.de   internet: http://www.ecmi.de
 
 
ECMI Working Paper # 12 
 
 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
Director: Marc Weller  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 2001. 
ISSN 1435-9812 
 
 
The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non-partisan 
institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of th  Kingdom of 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German State of 
Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in Flensburg, at the heart 
of the Danish-German border region, in order to draw from the 
encouraging example of peaceful coexistence between minorities and 
majorities achieved here. ECMI’s aim is to promote interdisciplinary 
research on issues related to minorities and majorities in a European 
perspective and to contribute to the improvement of inter-ethnic
relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethno-
political tension and conflict prevail. 
 
 
ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of ECMI or by 
outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not 
propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of its 
publications are the sole responsibility of the author concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECMI Working Paper # 12 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
© ECMI 2001 
  
  i 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Abbreviations.................................................................................................. ii 
 
Foreword........................................................................................................iii 
 
Introduction...................................................................................................1 
 
Chapter One: The Long Road to Rome.......................................................7 
 
     Introduction................................................................................................7 
     Laying the Foundation: Leipzig, Nuremberg, and Tokyo............................7 
     Choosing Justice After Atrocity: The International Criminal Tribunals for   
     the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.........................................................13 
     The Road to Rome....................................................................................17 
 
Chapter Two: The Evolution of Complementarity....................................20 
 
     Introduction..............................................................................................20 
     The 1953 Commission on International Criminal Jurisdiction...................21 
     The 1994 International Law Commission.................................................26 
     The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee...................................................................33 
     The 1996-1998 Preparatory Commission..................................................40 
 
Chapter Three: Complementarity in the Rome Statute............................51 
 
     Introduction..............................................................................................51 
     Complementarity in the Preamble.............................................................51 
     Complementarity in Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise  
     of Jurisdiction...........................................................................................53 
     Complementarity in Article 13: Trigger Mechanisms...............................60 
     Complementarity in Article 17: Issues of Admissibility............................63 
     Conclusion...............................................................................................68 
 
Conclusion...................................................................................................69 
 
Bibliography................................................................................................. 73 
 
 
 
  ii 
ABBREVIATIONS  
 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
ILC  International Law Commission 
 
IMT  International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 
IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo 
 
UN  United Nations 
 
UNWCC United Nations War Crimes Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
Foreword 
 
The establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal has been lingering on 
the international agenda since the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials. Various 
abortive drafting efforts were undertaken, but they were frustrated by the lack of a 
genuine desire on the part of states to assign jurisdiction in relation to certain crimes 
to the international level of governance. However the emergence of violent 
ethnopolitical strife in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, and the establishment of 
ad hoc international tribunals addressing those two cases, finally generated a strong 
impetus towards the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court at the turn 
of the century.  
 
This renewed interest in international criminal jurisdiction coincided with the 
consolidation in international law of several related legal concepts. The increasing 
acceptance of genuine universality of jurisdiction in relation to certain crimes with 
international implications, the acceptance of a greater international interest and role in 
the prosecution and suppression of practices like ethnic cleansing and genocide and 
the greater use of national courts to pursue suspected offenders extraterritorially all 
contributed to a climate that made the establishment of a permanent court possible. 
 
The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court that emerged is, however, not 
free of contradictions and tensions, revealing the still ambiguous views of 
governments in relation to the international exercise of jurisdiction in relation to 
individuals. Ms Farbstein, in her working paper, which is based on a thesis submitted 
in the University of Cambridge, provides for the first time a comprehensive analysis 
of one of the main areas where this governmental unease became most manifest in the 
negotiations: the issue of complementarity. 
 
Through her close analysis of the different stages of the drafting process leading up to 
the adoption of the Rome Statute, Ms Farbstein reveals not only the underlying 
tension between governmental pretensions of sovereign rights and the need to 
establish a truly independent and effective international court. This work also 
illuminates the opportunities and obstacles that the Tribunal will face when it comes 
into operation.  
 
In view of the strong interest of ECMI in the suppression of practices that have 
characterized recent ethnopolitical conflict in Europe, also through international 
criminal law, the Centre is particularly pleased to hav  been given the opportunity to 
publish this highly original contribution as a working paper. It is hoped that a 
consolidated and finalized version, amended in the light of comments that might be 
engendered, will appear in the European Yearbook of Ethnopolitics and Minority 
Issues in due course. 
 
Marc Weller 
ECMI Director 
1 August 2001 
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  
THE ISSUE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 1 
 
Susan Hannah FARBSTEIN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The prevalence of collective violence and the agony of mass atrocity may 
prove to be the twentieth century’s most distressing and enduring legacies.  From 
Germany to Uganda, from Cambodia to Sierra Leone, from the Former Yugoslavia to 
Rwanda, the past hundred years ar  replete with examples of terrifying violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law committed against diverse groups of people.  
Limited attempts to unveil the truth about past horrors, to hold individuals 
responsible, and to deter future offenses hav repeatedly proven inadequate.  A dearth 
of satisfactory moral and legal responses to these crimes often left victims suffering 
without any sense of reconciliation, while perpetrators routinely enjoyed impunity 
rather than facing justice. 
 Mass atrocity and violations of human rights present such deliberate and 
pervasive affronts to human dignity that standard moral assessment and the 
application of criminal law may seem both inappropriate and inadequate.  Hannah 
Arendt eloquently questioned the possibility of defining the Nazi defendants at 
Nuremberg as “criminally guilty” because, as she wrote, the crimes seemed to 
“explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what constitutes their 
monstrousness.  For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough.  It may well be 
essential to hang Goring, but it is totally inadequate.  That is, this guilt, in contrast to 
all other criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.”2  Yet over 
the past century, the response to war crimes, genocide, and vi lations of human rights 
has often been an attempt to prosecute those deemed culpable.  In these cases, a desire 
to protect State sovereignty and national criminal jurisdiction frequently clashed with 
                                               
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the support and guidance of her academic supervisor while at the 
Centre of International Studies in the University of Cambridge, Mr Marc Weller. 
2 Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers, quoted in Gary Jonathan Bass, “War Crimes and the 
Limits of Legalism,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 97, no. 6, May 1999, p. 2104.
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the impetus to hold genuine international prosecutions.  Consequently, although 
selected perpetrators were tried for their offenses in World Wars I and II, a permanent 
International Criminal Court was never established.  However, with the end of the 
Cold War and the erosion of State sovereignty, the rapidly changing international 
environment led to shifts in public opinion and State policy.  This facilitated the 
creation of two ad hoc international tribunals under United Nations auspices to try 
individuals accused of crimes committed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
Increasingly, the morally heinous nature of genocide, war crimes, and violations of 
human rights led the international community to claim a collective right to prosecute 
the perpetrators.  An international system cognizant of a shared interest in seeking 
justice offered the opportunity to establish a permanent International Criminal Court 
to prosecute and punish individuals responsible for these atrocious crimes.   
This thesis will explore the controversial issue of complementarity and the 
related tension between the International Criminal Court and national jurisdictions 
through a detailed analysis of the negotiations preceding, States’ positions regarding, 
and the final language of the Rome Statute adopted in 1998.  The critical question of 
complementarity exposes a major underlying rift in international law, between 
establishing meaningful collective jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of 
international concern, and the competing desire to maintain and protect State 
sovereignty.  Until the twentieth century, States claimed competence to exercise 
supreme sovereignty over all subjects inside their territory, and many powerful States 
did so without the risk of external intervention.  No constraints restricted this 
authority beyond those freely contracted into by the State.  However, in the final 
decade of the twentieth century, a post-modern international constitutional approach 
emerged that privileges collective community interests favoring justice over State 
sovereignty.  Traditional views of State sovereignty were increasingly deemed 
inappropriate or irrelevant to many pressing issues in international relations.  As a 
result, States are no longer understood to be the sole repository for public authority.  
Instead, it may be more pertinent to envision a layering of authority at different levels 
of the international system.3  A central issue for international criminal law has 
therefore become at what level the functions and duties of the international 
community will be exercised.  Thus, the struggle over the definition and application of 
                                               
3 Credit for this idea is due to discussions with Marc Weller. 
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complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can be 
interpreted as a response to the question of where authority will reside in the 
international system.   
Within this context, four different approaches to the issue of complementarity, 
as embodied in various draft Statutes for an International Criminal Court, can be 
differentiated.  The first position, reflecting a classical view of State sovereignty, 
minimizes the role of international s ciety and community interests in criminal 
justice.  From this perspective, if an International Criminal Court were created, it 
could only exist with the explicit consent of States and under rigid limitations 
imposed by States, and would function as an organ of those States specifically 
affected.  Thus, an International Criminal Court would not so much complement 
national jurisdictions, in the sense of working in tandem with them to render justice, 
but would rather be a direct extension of national jurisdictions and function under 
their control and on their behalf.  A second approach adopts an intermediate view.  
While the primary layer of authority continues to reside with States, an international 
constitutional interest in investigating and prosecuting fundamental crimes is 
simultaneously recognized.  Thus, an international court would function when States 
prove unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations to deliver justice.  In this sense, 
an International Criminal Court would complement national systems when they fail to 
render justice, and would supplement and complete, rather than impose upon, national 
efforts.  A third, broader approach, acknowledges core crimes of such horrendous 
character that the international community has an overwhelming interest in punishing 
the perpetrators.  These core crimes would certainly include genocide, and might be 
extended to include war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.  For such 
crimes, authority could be exercised and justice rendered either at th  na ional level 
by States or at the international level by a permanent criminal court.  Therefore, an 
international court would complement national systems to the extent that while 
primacy would rest with national courts, justice for core crimes could be d livered at 
either the national or the international level.  Finally, a fourth approach locates 
primary authority for international criminal justice at the international layer.  This 
configuration already exists, for limited circumstances, in the form of the ad hoc 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Under such a jurisdictional regime, 
national systems complement international courts, rather than the reverse. 
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Complementarity manifests itself through three primary issues in the draft 
Statutes and Rome Statute of the ICC.  Each will be analyzed in subsequent chapters 
in order to better understand the evolution of complementarity and the jurisdictional 
regime of the Court.  The first emanation of complementarity is subject matter 
jurisdiction, which defines the crimes that the Court will be granted authority to 
prosecute.  Throughout the Statute drafting process, the broadness of the Court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction was highly contested.  Predictably, willingness to permit 
the Court greater reach in its subject matter jurisdiction often generated resistance 
from States attempting to preserve national primacy.  In the Rome Statute, the ICC 
was granted limited subject matter jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of 
international concern, specifically genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, 
as well as the crime of aggression.  Narrowing the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
was considered necessary in order to create a regime of complementary jurisdiction.  
Although States retain pr macy in international criminal prosecutions, the Court can 
intervene in cases of grave violations of international concern. 
Complementarity also emerges in the preconditions to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court, specifically the mechanisms for triggering ICC jurisdiction.  
Throughout the drafting process, divergent views were offered about whether States 
Parties, the Security Council, an independent Prosecutor, or some combination thereof 
should be allowed to initiate proceedings.  Although it was generally agreed that any 
State Party could trigger jurisdiction given the serious nature of the crimes, some 
States feared that permitting the Security Council to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction 
would politicize the Court and make it little more than a tool m ipulated by the great 
powers.  In contrast, others argued that the only way to assure an active role for the 
Court was to allow the Security Council to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction when 
individual States proved unwilling.  Similarly, some States worried that an 
overzealous or politically motivated Prosecutor might lead to abuses of power.  Others 
asserted that granting the Prosecutor independence would secure a viable and 
effective Court, as State complaints and Security Council referral might prove 
insufficient to allow the ICC to operate on behalf of the entire international 
community.  Unless the Prosecutor could trigger the Court’s jurisdiction, the 
reluctance of State Parties to make complaints and a potential Security Council veto 
might hinder referrals of appropriate cases.  Thus, establishing preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court would become a necessary step in creating a 
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regime of complementarity that could successfully balance concerns for State 
sovereignty against the imperative of meaningful international justice. 
Complementarity also appears in the methods for State consent and acceptance 
of the Court’s jurisdiction.  Three different models for State acceptance were 
considered throughout the drafting process.  The broadest is a constitutional model for 
all crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, based upon universal 
jurisdiction.  Under this regime of State consent, even if only a few States sign the 
treaty bringing the ICC into existence, the Court is still understood to have objective 
personality over all States.  Because each State, individually, has the right to try core 
crimes without the consent of any other State, this right could be pooled and 
collectively granted to the ICC.  Thus, the Cour  might exercise its jurisdiction in any 
given case without the specific consent of States.  A variation of this model would 
apply universal jurisdiction only to the crime of genocide based upon the terms of the 
Genocide Convention, which specifically outlines the creation of an International 
Criminal Court to try perpetrators of genocide.  A second approach to the issue of 
State consent is inherent jurisdiction.  Under this system, a State would automatically 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court over core crimes by becoming Party to the Statute 
through ratification.  This approach was often considered in tandem with a 
categorization of States whose consent would be required for the ICC to investigate 
and prosecute.  Although delegations disagreed as to whether his list should be 
disjunctive or conjunctive, types of States on the list variously included the territorial 
State, the State of nationality of the accused, the State of nationality of the victim, and 
the custodial State.  Thus, if one or a combination of these States were a Party to the 
Statute, under inherent jurisdiction the Court could act without securing any 
additional specific State consent.  The third and most restrictive model for State 
acceptance is a specific consent model, also known as an “opt-in” regime.  Like 
inherent jurisdiction, this regime would work in conjunction with categories of States 
that must accept the Court’s jurisdiction.  However, in the case of specific consent, 
even after a State ratifies the treaty it would still have to specifically accept the 
Court’s jurisdiction either ad hoc on a case-by-case basis, or once to accept ICC 
jurisdiction over a restricted category of crimes.  Thus, the question of what model of 
State consent to adopt was crucially linked to the regime of complementarity that 
would emerge.  Although States feared handicapping the Court by creating 
requirements for State acceptance that were unduly restrictive, they simultaneously 
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worried that accepting a constitutional approach might grant the Court excessive 
authority to act independently of States, rather than complementing national 
jurisdictions. 
The widely divergent interpretations and approaches to these interconnected 
issues demonstrate the importance of the struggle over the meaning and practical 
implementation of complementarity, which may determine whether the International 
Criminal Court becomes a powerful tool in the search for international criminal 
justice, or merely a weak and inactive institution.  Will complementarity allow the 
Court to effectively detain, prosecute, and convict the most horrendous violators of 
human rights and humanitarian law at the international level?  Or will the specter of 
State sovereignty compromise or even incapacitate the operation of the ICC, sabotage 
its ability to render meaningful justice, and thus undermine the rule of international 
law itself?  Such crucial questions can only be answered with reference to the Court’s 
jurisdictional regime based upon complementarity.  This thesis therefore explores the 
principle of complementarity as it developed and was finally enshrined in the Rome 
Statute.  The first chapter outlines the relevant historical background to the permanent 
Court by examining prior twentieth century international tribunals.  The second 
chapter then traces the evolution of the provisions regarding complementarity by 
considering chronologically four different draft Statutes for the ICC.  The third 
chapter evaluates complementarity as enshrined in the Rome Statute through a 
detailed analysis of the drafting process and the final language of the relevant articles.  
Finally, the conclusion summarizes significant implications for justice in the current 
international system that can be derived from this examination of complementarity. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE LONG ROAD TO ROME 
 
Introduction 
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on July 17, 
1998 with a non-recorded vote of 120 states in favor, seven opposed, and 21 
abstentions.4  Over the preceding five weeks, 160 countries, 33 intergovernmental 
organizations, and 236 non-governmental organizations participated in discussions, 
drafting, and debates which led to the formulation of the Rome Statute, which will 
come into force when 60 States ratify the Treaty.5  However, the development of a 
permanent International Criminal Court was a process which extended for over a 
century, and which moved in fits and starts towards the current incarnation of the 
Court. 
 
Laying the Foundation: Leipzig, Nuremberg, and Tokyo 
 Between 1919 and 1994, there were five ad hoc international investigative 
commissions,6 four ad hoc international criminal tribunals,7 and three internationally 
mandated national prosecutions arising out of World Wars I and II.8  However, in 
most of these cases the aim of pursuing justice by independent, effective, and fair 
methods was compromised in deference to realpolitik goals.  From the turn of the 
century through 1945, the major obstacles to a permanent International Criminal 
Court were assumptions about State sovereignty supporting the exclusive competence 
of States over criminal matters, and a lack of consensus about whether such a Court 
could help prevent war.  As a result, the consensus necessary to fully develop a 
functioning system of international justice was lacking.  
                                               
4 Although the vote was not recorded, it is widely agreed that those voting in opposition were China, 
Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen. 
5 As of July 15, 2001, there are 139 signatories and 35 ratifications. 
6 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War and on the Enforcement of Penalties (1919), 
United Nations War Crimes Commission (1943), Far Eastern Commission (1946), Commission of 
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 to Investigate War Crimes and Other 
Violations of International Humanitarian L w in the Former Yugoslavia (1992), Independent 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 to Investigate Grave 
Violations of Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda (1994). 
7 International Military Tribunal at Nurembe g (1945), International Military Tribunal at Tokyo (1946), 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993), International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (1994). 
8 Prosecution by the German Supreme Court Pursuant to Allied requests on the Treaty of Versailles 
(1921-23), Prosecution by the Four Major Allies in the European Theater Pursuant to Control Council 
Law Number 10 (1946-55), Military Prosecution by Allied Powers in the Far East Pursuant to the 
Directives of the Far Eastern Commission (1946-51). 
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At the end of World War I, the Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, established by the victorious 
Allies, investigated and reported upon the culpability of the defeated nations.  The 
Commission determined that individuals, regardless of their rank, could be tried for 
violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity.  As such, the 
Commission proposed an international tribunal to prosecute “all enemy persons 
alleged to have been guilty of offenses against the laws of war, customs of war, and 
laws of humanity.”9 Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles thus provided for the 
creation of a special ad hoc tribunal to try Kaiser Wilhelm II for “the supreme offense 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”10 committed by initiating 
the war, while Articles 228 and 229 provided for prosecution before Allied military 
tribunals of German military personnel accused of violating the laws and customs of 
war.  However, the Netherlands refused to extradite the Kaiser, thereby blocking his 
trial.  The German government objected to the list of alleged war criminals submitted 
by the Allies, and eventually assumed jurisdiction to prosecute at Leipzig.  The results 
were unsatisfactory because Allied political will to pursue justice quickly faded, as 
did public interest in prosecutions, and domestic political concerns as well as the 
future of peace in Europe were prioritized over justice for past atrocities.  In the final 
analysis, 
[t]he Allies’ pursuit of German war criminals invited disaster: it made the 
Allies look vindictive and weak; it divided America and Britain and France 
from each other; it showed that Germany could get away with failing to 
comply to the Treaty of Versailles; it kept wartime passions from cooling; and 
worst of all, it galvanized the German right and thus helped to undermine 
democracy in the Weimar Republic.11 
 
Those responsible for the killing of 600,000 Armenians in Turkey during the war also 
went unpunished.  In 1923, the Treaty of Sevres called for the trial of perpetrators of 
this crime against humanity, but debates about whether to prosecute a crime which 
                                               
9 Leila Sadat, “The Establishment of the International Criminal Court: From the Hague to Rome and 
Back Again,” Journal of International Law and Practice, Vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 1999, p. 103 [hereinafter 
Sadat]. 
10 Sadat p. 103. 
11 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) pp. 104-105 [hereinafter Bass]. 
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some Allies perceived as not clearly established in international law prevented the 
adoption of the treaty.  The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia prompted fears among the 
Allies that Turkey would also be lost to the Communism, and the subsequent Treaty 
of Lausanee granted clemency to those responsible for the atrocities to regain favor in 
the region.12 
During the interwar period, interest in creating a permanent International 
Criminal Court grew, as did enthusiasm for the notion that individuals could be held 
accountable for violating international law.  The original concept for the League of 
Nations’ Permanent Court f International Justice included a proposal for a parallel 
High Court of International Justice to try individuals for international crimes 
“constituting a breach of international public order or against the universal law of 
nations.”13  Although the International Law Association debated proposals for the 
creation of this court, no final conclusions or recommendations were reached.  In 
1937, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was paired 
with the first general multilateral agreement for the creation of an International 
Criminal Court.  Yet with World War II looming when the convention was adopted, 
the treaty to establish a court was never ratified by the signatories.14   
Efforts to create international tribunals continued with the Second World War 
and proved significantly more successful.  As early as 1941, the London International 
Assembly called for the creation of an international court to prosecute war criminals.  
The Allies outlined their goals in the Saint James Declaration of 1942, which noted 
that “the sense of justice of the civilized world” required “the punishment, through the 
channel of organized justice, of those guilty or responsible” for the crimes of World 
War II.15  In 1943, the United Nations War Crimes Commission was created to 
investigate crimes and propose the format of a court.16  As victory grew imminent, the 
Allied leaders declared that Germans who were “responsible for, or have taken a 
consenting part in the…atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back to the 
                                               
12 Matthew D. Peter, “The Proposed International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Legal and 
Political Debates Regarding Jurisdiction that Threaten the Establishment of an Effective Court,”  
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 24, Fall 1997, pp. 181-182. 
13 Paul D. Marquardt, “Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an Internation l Crimi l 
Court,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 33, no. 1, 1995, p. 80 [hereinafter Marquardt].  
Bryan F. MacPherson, “Building and International Criminal Court for the 21st Century,” Connecticut 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, no. 1, Winter 1998, p. 7 [hereinafter MacPherson]. 
14 Marquardt pp. 80- 1. 
15 MacPherson p. 8. 
16 Marquardt p. 81. 
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countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged 
and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free 
governments which will be created therein.”17  Although many within the United 
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union initially called for summary executions of 
German war criminals, in the end a legal approach led to the creation of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.  
Justice Robert Jackson, in his opening statement at Nuremberg, underlined the 
significance of the effort when he noted, “That four great nations, flushed with victory 
and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive 
enemies to judgment of the law is one of the most significant ributes that Power has 
ever paid to Reason.”18  Although the tribunal is often remembered as a product of 
Allied horror and outrage about the Holocaust, in fact “America and Britain, the two 
liberal countries that played major roles in deciding what Nuremberg would be, 
actually focused far more on the criminality of Nazi aggression than on the 
Holocaust.”19  The tribunal was constituted by an international agreement, the London 
Accord, signed by the four Allied powers.  The purpose was to try “war criminals 
whose offenses have no particular geographic location, whether they be accused 
individually or in their capacity as members of organizations or groups.”20  The 
subject matter jurisdiction included crimes against peace or waging a war of 
aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, based upon the assumption that 
these were crimes of international concern. The justices themselves noted that the 
Charter establishing the tribunal was  
not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of victorious nations, but i  the 
view of the Tribunal…it is the expression of international law existing at the 
time of its creation….The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the 
law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the 
trial.  In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might have 
                                               
17 Bass p. 149. 
18 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 
1992) p. 167. 
19 Bass p. 148. 
20 Sadat p. 105. 
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done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set 
up special courts to administer law.21 
  
The justices at Nuremberg thus perceived themselves to be exercising universal 
jurisdiction over “acts universally recognized as criminal, which  [are] considered a 
grave matter of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State that would have control over it u der rdinary 
circumstances.”22  The Tribunal was also grounded upon territorial jurisdiction, in that 
it was created by the occupying powers at a time when they had assumed the 
sovereign functions of the German State under the terms of unconditional surrender.  
It also rested on a type of extraterritorial jurisdiction, as many of the accused were 
tried for crimes committed abroad.23 
One crucial legacy of Nuremberg was the decision that individuals, including 
heads of State and those acting under orders, could be held criminally responsible 
under international law.  As the judgment noted, “crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provision of international law be enforced.”24  By 
establishing individual accountability for these crimes, the justices at Nuremberg 
explicitly rejected the argument that State sovereignty can be used as a defense for 
unconscionable acts, even when those actions are cloaked by the uthority of the 
State.  The judgment additionally affirmed the primacy of international law over 
national law, asserting  
that international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as upon 
States has long been recognized…. The very essence of th  [Nuremberg] 
Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the 
                                               
21 Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1995) pp. 37-38 [hereinafter 
Morris and Scharf]. 
22 Christopher C. Joyner, “Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War 
Criminals to Accountability,” Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, no. 4, 1996, p. 167 [hereinafter 
Joyner]. 
23 Michael P. Scharf, “The International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party 
States,” The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International 
Law, Sarah B. Sewall and Karl Kaysen, eds. (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2000) pp. 228- 29 [hereinafter Scharf]. 
24 Marcus R. Mumford, “Building Upon A Foundation of Sand: A Commentary on the International 
Criminal Court Treaty Conference,” Journal of International Law and Practice, Vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 
1999, p. 159 [hereinafter Mumford]. 
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national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.  He who 
violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of 
the authority of the State, if the State in authorizing action moves outside its 
competence under international law.25   
 
The fact that actions were permitted or even required under domestic law provided 
neither excuse nor justification for a violation of international law.  Nazi leaders were 
tried for acts committed against their own citizens as well as for atrocities committed 
as an occupying power.  This was the first clear legal demonstration that both 
individuals and States are responsible under international law for acts that may fall 
within a State’s national jurisdiction.  Additionally, the charge of waging an 
aggressive war brought a traditionally sovereign right of States under the purview of 
international criminal law.26  In contrast to the strong legacy of Nuremberg, the Far 
Eastern Commission and Tokyo Tribunal that followed World War II were highly 
politicized.  Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, this tribunal was based upon a military 
order issued by the commanding officer of the Allied armed forces.  The tribunal itself 
was fraught with procedural irregularities and marred by abuses of judicial discretion.  
Defendants were chosen on the basis of political criteria rather than criminal behavior, 
and their trials were generally perceived to be unfair. 
The trials held at the conclusion of both World Wars demonstrate the benefits 
and weaknesses of international prosecutions, as well as the difficulty of establishing 
a tribunal to confront gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law.  At the 
conclusion of World War I, political considerations undermined moral and legal 
obligations, resulting in embarrassing impunity for perpetrators.  Although interest in 
creating a permanent criminal court grew during the interwar period, political realities 
and the desire to protect State sovereignty superceded legalist aspirations.  The 
Nuremberg Tribunal after World War II, based upon universal jurisdiction over 
crimes which shocked the conscience of mankind, set a new standard for future 
international criminal prosecution by establishing individual criminal responsibility 
for heinous violations of international law.  But despite such notable progress, no 
permanent tribunal resulted from the legacy of Nuremberg.  In fact, the world would 
                                               
25 Sadat p. 106. 
26 Marquardt p. 82. 
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wait over half a century before another d hoc international criminal tribunal was 
convened. 
 
Choosing Justice After Atrocity: The International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
With the end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalization, more 
universal norms concerning fundamental human rights emerged and were clearly 
articulated as worthy of protection.  As consensus began to form supporting standards 
that States should uphold within their own borders and with respect to their own 
population, State sovereignty was necessarily weakened.  In the waning years of the 
twentieth century, intense and detailed media coverage of atrocities, combined with 
new support within the UN Security Council, fueled the imperative for justice in cases 
of massive violations of human rights.  After nearly fifty years without an 
international criminal prosecution, the ethnic cleansings committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda over the first half of the 1990s, and the international 
community’s inadequate response to these atrociti s, provided the impetus for the 
formation of two new international criminal courts. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was 
established in 1993,27 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994.28  Both were 
created through UN Security Council Resolutions as ad hoc organs in response to 
specific threats to international peace and security, and both have a limited territorial 
and temporal jurisdiction.29  These tribunals constitute international judicial 
interventions and enforcement echanisms under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
Dual legal bases supported the Security Council in establishing these tribunals.  In 
both cases, the Security Council recognized the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter.  Additionally, the Security 
Council found that, in the terms of Articles 2(7) and 41 of the UN Charter, the 
establishment of subsidiary organs to perform judicial functions was necessary to 
                                               
27 Security Council Resolution 827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/827, 1993. 
28 Security Council Resolution 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/955, 1994. 
29 The ICTY can investigate and prosecute conduct occurring sin e January 1, 1991 in the territory of 
the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while the ICTR can examine breaches of 
international humanitarian law that occurred in Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 
1994. 
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maintain and restore international peace and security.30  Some critics believe that the 
creation of these tribunals under Chapter VII “means that the legal justifications for 
the establishment of the Tribunal rests not on the inherent value of enforcing the law 
or upholding justice, but on the decision of the Council that the creation of the 
Tribunal will contribute to the restoration of international peace and security.”31  Yet 
establishing the tribunals through Security Council Resolutions offered important 
advantages.  It provided an expeditious meth d avoiding time-consuming negotiations 
and ratification of a treaty.  The Security Council was able to act relatively quickly on 
the basis of reports by the Secretary-Gene al, and the decision to form a tribunal under 
Chapter VII became effective immedately and created binding obligations for all UN 
Member States, as outlined in Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter.32  Moreover, by 
establishing ad hoc tribunals through Security Council Resolutions, Member States 
emphatically asserted an emerging internatio al consensus supporting international 
criminal jurisdiction for the grossest violations of human rights.  Like the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, the ICTY and ICTR represent a collective exercise of the universal 
jurisdiction of States, which in creating the tribunals “acted not as individual States on 
their own behalf, but as Member States of the UN Security Council acting on behalf 
of the international community.” 33 
Both ad hoc tribunals are based upon a system of concurrent jurisdiction 
between national and international courts.  As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
explained, “it was not the intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the 
exercise of jurisdiction by national courts with respect to such acts.  Indeed, national 
courts should be encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the 
relevant national laws and procedures.”34  The Security Council noted that “the aim 
was solely to stimulate national courts to exercise their existing jurisdiction.”35 The 
primacy of the ad hoc tribunals does not prevent national courts from exercising 
                                               
30 Catherine Cisse, “The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some 
Elements of Comparison,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vo . 7, no. 1, Spring 
1997, p. 106 [hereinafter Cisse]. 
31 J. Oppenheim and W. van der Wolf, Global War Crimes Tribunal Collection, Volume II: The 
Yugoslav Tribunal (Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Wolf Global Legal Publishers, 1999) p. 15 
[hereinafter Oppenheim and van der Wolf]. 
32 Morris and Scharf p. 42. 
33 Scharf p. 225. 
34 Immi Tallgren, “Completing the International Crimi l Order,” Nordic Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 47, no. 2, 1998, p. 117 [hereinafter Tallgren]. 
35 Tallgren p. 117. 
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jurisdiction, but rather grants the international tribunals the authority to decide 
whether to supercede a national court in a given case.  Thus, concurrent jurisdiction 
outlined in ICTY Article 9 and ICTR Article 8 is subject to the primacy of the 
international tribunal.  At any stage, the international tribunal may request that 
national courts defer to the ac hoc tribunal’s competence in order to assure that 
minimum standards of justice and impartial adjudic tion will be met. 
The term “primacy” was used in an attempt to convey a somewhat 
complicated notion of jurisdictional hierarchy in which States were 
encouraged to assume a substantial portion of the responsibility for the 
prosecution and the trial of the apparently large number of perpetrators of 
reported atrocities, while at the same time preserving the inherent supremacy 
of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal which may need to be asserted 
for various reasons in particular cases—not in the usual sense of reviewing the 
decisions of “lower” courts but rather to exercise jurisdiction in the first 
instance as a trial court.36 
 
The primacy of the ICTY and ICTR is thus a discretionary power to be exercised by 
the tribunals, not an obligation.  Although the primacy of the ICTY and ICTR does 
compromise State sovereignty, this was tolerated because the ad hoc tribunals were 
created in response to specific threats to peace and security and are temporary 
institutions with a strictly limited reach.  “All cases within the jurisdiction of the ad 
hoc tribunals involve fundamental humanitarian interests of concern to the 
international community as a whole…. Each of the ad hoc tribunals was created to 
address a threat to international peace and security—the main enance of which is the 
primary purpose of the UN.”37  Primacy was also accepted because of its advantages 
in potentially providing more uniformity in the legal process and because the 
jurisdiction of all States would be subject to the same limitations.  The statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR, which recognize that national courts have concurrent jurisdiction but 
endow the international tribunals with primacy, thus represent the “high water mark 
for the priority of international criminal tribunals over national courts.”38 
                                               
36 Morris and Scharf p. 126. 
37 Bartram S. Brown  “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts 
and International Criminal Tribunals.”  The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 
1998, pp. 407-408 [hereinafter Brown]. 
38 Brown p. 385. 
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 However, the ad hoc tribunals have been criticized on various grounds, 
including the fact that as creations of the Security Council, they are subject to political 
vagaries that influence that body.  Thus, “no matter how successful the ad hoc 
tribunals may be at dealing with specific crisis situations, their selective creation and 
narrow focus creates an impression of unfairness and unequal treatment.”39  Many 
observers view the ICTY and ICTR as politically biased institutions because of their 
origins and dependence upon the world’s great powers for support.  This is perhaps 
the tribunals’ greatest weakness, as demonstrated by the difficulty of arresting 
indicted criminals and a lack of meaningful recourse when States refuse to participate.  
The critical problem lies in “the reluctance of the Security Council and its key 
members to take stronger action to arrest indictees and to sanction states that fail or 
refuse to cooperate” with the tribunals.40   
Despite these shortcomings, the very existence of th se tribunals sends “a 
powerful message.  Their Statutes, rules of procedure and evidence, and practice 
stimulate the development of the law.  The possible fear by States that the activities of 
such tribunals might preempt national prosecutions could also have the beneficial 
effect of spurring prosecutions before national courts for serious violations of 
humanitarian law.”41 Moreover, although the tribunals are a Security Council creation, 
they are not instruments designed to render victors’ justice.  The ICTY and ICTR 
were established by the world’s great powers, rather than by the military or political 
victors of the conflicts.  Thus, one may question the fairness of establishing tribunals 
to try the criminals in these conflicts while neglecting to pursue perpetrators in, for 
example, Cambodia or Sierra Leone, due to political considerations.  However, the 
integrity of the tribunal processes in the pursuit of justice is not so easily criticized.  In 
fact, the demonstrable fairness of the trials helped mitigat  fears about an 
overreaching permanent ICC.  “Rules of precedent and procedure bounded ICT 
actions almost to a fault…but proved that an international tribunal could exercise 
‘ordinary law in extraordinary circumstances.’ ”42 Although the ICTY and ICTR have 
                                               
39 Brown p. 386. 
40 Brown p. 433. 
41 Theodor Meron, “International Criminalization of Atrocities,” American Journal of International 
Law, p. 555 [hereinafter Meron]. 
42 Sarah B. Sewall, Carl Kaysen, and Michael P. Scharf, “The United States and the International 
Criminal Court: An Overview,” The United States and the International Criminal Court: National 
Security and International Law, Sarah B. Sewall and Karl Kaysen, eds. (New York, NY: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000) p. 6 [hereinafter Sewall, Kaysen, and Scharf]. 
  17
suffered from delays which result from the genuine exercise of due process, they have 
been strictly managed by rules of precedent and procedure, thereby supporting 
legalism.  Yet this moral strength has also proven a practical weakness: 
While the Allies in World Wars I and II sat in judgment because of the 
morally arbitrary fact of having won a war, their wartime anger and bitterness 
could as a matter of crude politics be translated into a resolute desire to punish 
the war criminals, to translate chang  into right.  No so for the ICTY.  None of 
the great powers in 1993 were seriously committed to the punishment of ex-
Yugoslav war criminals.  The punishment of Axis war criminals was a matter 
of first order for the Allies; the punishment of ex-Yugoslav war criminals 
weighed heavily on Bosnian minds, but not on those of American and 
European diplomats.  So the Hague tribunal was more pure than its 
predecessors, but also far weaker.43 
 
Thus, the very existence and limited successes of the ICTY and ICTR, coupled with 
their ad hoc character and Security Council creation, and the difficulty of recruiting 
prosecutors and judges, securing facilities, financing their activities, and obtaining 
custody of suspects, emphasized the need for a permanent court. 
 
The Road to Rome 
The road to the Rome Conference of 1998 extends back fifty years, to the 
conclusion of World War II.  In 1948, with the recent Nuremberg experience as an 
impetus, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
demanded the creation of an international tribunal to try persons charged with 
genocide.  If the accused could not be prosecuted before a court of the State in which 
the act was committed, they would be judged “by such international penal tribunals as 
may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction.”44  That same year, the UN General Assembly requested the 
International Law Commission undertake a study of the desirability and feasibility of 
                                               
43 Richard J. Goldstone and Gary Jonathan Bass, “Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunals,” 
The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law, 
Sarah B. Sewall and Karl Kaysen, eds. (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000)  
p. 51. 
44 Jelena Pejic, “Creating a Permanent Inter ational Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence 
and Effectiveness,”  Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 29, no. 2, Spring 1998. 
 
  18
establishing a permanent International Criminal Court.  The ILC concluded in 1950 
that an International Criminal Court was both possible and potentially valuable, 
prompting the General Assembly to establish a Committee on International Criminal 
Jurisdiction.  This committee, composed of 17 Member States, was charged with 
preparing concrete proposals for such a Court, and in 1951 submitted a first draft 
Statute, which was revised and amended in 1953.   
However, the draft Statute was never adopted due to a lack of political 
consensus.   
Throughout the 1950s, numerous States objected to an International Criminal Court 
fearing it would undermine national sovereignty, interfere with domestic affairs of 
Member States in violation of UN Charter Article 2(7), and infringe upon the role of 
the International Court of Justice as well as the Security Council.45  The 1953 draft 
Statute was tabled until a Draft Code of Offenses over which the proposed court 
would have jurisdiction could be considered.  Although this document was submitted 
in 1954, it failed to define the crime of aggression, so the process was again 
postponed until aggression could be precisely delimited.  Four separate committees 
considered the question of aggression between 1952 and 1974, and a definition was 
eventually adopted by the General Assembly in 1974.46  However, the process again 
stalled due to lack of political will among UN members.  The unique circumstances 
that made Nuremberg possible, most notably a broadly supported coalition that 
decisively defeated an obvious aggressor who had violated the laws of war and 
humanity, never recurred, which minimized the opportunities for creating a new 
Court.  Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court was seen as a threat to national security and State 
sovereignty in the context of the Cold War, and gross abuses of innocent civilian 
populations were therefore generally ignored in international legal arenas due to 
pragmatic political considerations.47   
In 1989, a General Assembly request for a report on international criminal 
jurisdiction over drug trafficking was creatively expanded by the ILC to address the 
creation of an International Criminal Court.48  The ILC provisionally adopted a draft 
                                               
45 Marquardt p. 85. 
46 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 
Vol. 10, Spring 1999, p. 53 [hereinafter Bassiouni]. 
47 Morris and Scharf p. 14. 
48 Sadat p. 111. 
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Code of Crimes in 1991, thereby circumventing potential controversy by 
disconnecting the draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
from the proposed Court.  The project gained momentum after the creation of the 
ICTY and ICTR, which emphasized the need for and potential government support of 
a permanent Court.  An Ad Hoc Committee was thus established to critique the ILC 
draft and prepare a report that would become the basis for the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.  The 
PrepComm was open to all UN members, and by 1997 prepared a consolidated text to 
be considered by a conference of the plenipotentiaries.  This document was issued in 
April 1998, and provided the basis for the negotiations at Rome that led to the 
expeditious adoption of the Rome Statute.  After this long, circuitous route, a Statute 
for a permanent International Criminal Court was finally adopted. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEMENTARITY  
 
Introduction 
 A fundamental issue facing the drafters of the Rome Statute was the role the 
ICC would play relative to national courts.  The prevailing view was that the Court 
should complement rather that supplant national jurisdictions, yet defining this precise 
relationship would prove both politically sensitive and legally complex.  While many 
States supported establishing a permanent International Criminal Court, they 
remained reluctant to create any organ that would impinge upon national sovereignty.  
This tension was especially cogent because under existing international law, the right 
to prosecute crimes within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction rests with States, 
many of which resisted challenges by the actions of an international body.  However, 
other States and non-g vernmental organizations believed the Court should have a 
broader role, including opportunities to intervene whenever national courts were 
unable to fulfill their obligations or proved ineffective in rendering meaningful 
justice.  The juxtaposition of these competing visions, one favoring an international 
constitutional approach that privileges collective community interests, the other 
favoring State sovereignty in criminal proceedings, defined the on-going debate about 
complementarity and the meaning of internatio al justice.  In order to evaluate these 
positions, this chapter will trace the evolution of the provisions regarding 
complementarity by considering chronologically the draft Statute of the 1953 
Commission on International Criminal Jurisdiction, the 1994 report and draft Statute 
of the International Law Commission, the comments of delegations to the Ad Hoc 
Committee in 1995, and finally the decisions and draft Statute of the Preparatory 
Committee from 1996 through 1998.  These drafts were selected because they 
represent significant and revealing efforts in the campaign to create a workable 
Statute for an International Criminal Court.  In each phase of the drafting process, the 
delegations examined complementarity as expressed in subject matter jurisdicion, 
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, and State consent and acceptance of 
jurisdiction.  Throughout this chapter, the focus will be upon the process and 
techniques used to manage the tension between demands for genuine criminal justice 
and the imperative to protect State sovereignty. 
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The 1953 Commission on International Criminal Jurisdiction 
 In the aftermath of World War II, and following the success of Nuremberg and 
the inadequacies of Tokyo, the UN General Assembly realized that “in the course of 
development of the international community, there will be an increasing need of an 
international judicial organ for the trial of certain crimes under international law.”49  
The Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction therefore convened to review 
an existing draft Statute from 1951 for the creation of a permanent International 
Criminal Court.  Member States at the time conceded that  
in the present stage of international relations and international organization, 
any attempt to establish an inter ational criminal jurisdiction would meet with 
insurmountable obstacles.  As an ultimate objective an international criminal 
court would be desirable, but at the present time would do more harm than 
good.  The rigid maintenance of criminal justice was likely to endanger the 
maintenance of peace.50   
 
Although the view that justice would contribute to building and sustaining peace 
eventually prevailed, concerns voiced in 1953 continued to echo throughout the next 
fifty years.  The debate between States favoring n active Court vested with 
significant authority at the international level, and those preferring a Court that would 
not impair State sovereignty and national jurisdiction, would be repeated each time 
the opportunity to create an International Criminal Court arose. 
In the 1953 discussions, many Member States not only proved unwilling to 
sacrifice any degree of sovereignty to international jurisdiction, they also doubted the 
existence of an international community of States that would support a permanent 
International Criminal Court.  During the drafting stages, it became necessary to 
clarify explicitly that “no Member, by participating in the deliberations of the 
Committee and by voting on any principle of draft text, would commit his 
government to any of the decisions which might eventually be adopted.”51  As his 
reservation indicates, protection of traditional State sovereignty was a recurrent and 
                                               
49 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report of the 1953 Committee on International 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July to 20 August, 1953, UNGAOR, 9th Sess. Supp. No. 12, A/2645, 1954, p. 
1 [hereinafter Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction]. 
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central theme.  Many States felt the effort to create an effective International Criminal 
Court was futile: 
Present international law was based on relations among States.  The Charter of 
the UN was also based thereon.  International criminal jurisdiction over 
individuals, therefore, did not fit within the present set-up of th  UN.  An 
international criminal court presupposed an international community with the 
power necessary to operate the Court, and such power did not exist.  A 
surrender of some present State sovereignty would be the condition for the 
establishment of the Court, and such surrender was highly unlikely.  
Therefore, the Court would be powerless, and its establishment would be an 
empty gesture.52 
 
Some delegations therefore asserted that the United Nations should proceed no further 
in attempting to establish a Court, presuming that most States would be unwilling to 
compromise sufficient sovereignty to create a functional organ for international 
justice. 
In contrast, other Members emphasized 
that modern international law was beginning to recognize the individual as a 
subject possessing rights…and also possessing duties.  In the judgment of 
Nuremberg, it was decided that those duties transcended even obligations to 
the national State.  The moral obligation of living up to the principles of the 
post-war judgments, and the undeniable fact of the existence of a common 
standard of norms to be applied…made international criminal jurisdiction 
desirable, and it should be promoted by establishing the possibility of such 
international criminal jurisdiction as far as present inter-State relations would 
permit.53 
 
Thus, some States did favor establishing a Court, albeit one with jurisdiction 
dependent upon their voluntary consent.  The five essential qualities of stability, 
permanence, independence, effectiveness, and universality were identified as 
mandatory for the Court’s success.  These States recognized that “it was useless and 
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even dangerous to create a court of inferior quality, which would not have an adequate 
measure of any of these characteristics…. It was better to have no international 
criminal court than a second-rate one.”54  But again, in a debate that was to be 
revisited throughout the next half-century, other States felt that it would be impossible 
to establish a Court capable of meeting these aspirations and therefore preferred a 
reasonable compromise.  These States thought it “unrealistic to insist upon perfection 
at the outset.  In the present rather primitive stage of inter-State relations, an 
international criminal jurisdiction which would not reach the level of domestic 
jurisdictions would be adequate.  All legal institutions needed time to grow and 
develop.”55  Therefore, some maintained that “international criminal jurisdiction, on 
the basis of a very modest beginning, should be given a chance to grow.  It was better 
to create a court with imperfect powers and limited competence than to create none at 
all.”56  
 Once the Committee decided that it would pursue a draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court, questions of subject matter jurisdiction became a central 
point of contention.  For example, one issue was whether to grant the Court 
jurisdiction over national crimes of international concern.  Belgium and France argued 
“that it would be useful to provide expressly that a State could, if it deemed it 
appropriate in certain cases of great leal and political complexity, give the 
international court the jurisdiction which would normally be exercised by domestic 
courts.”57  However, this proposal was rejected because the concept of “crimes under 
national law of international concern” was too vague, and “to give the Court power to 
deal with crimes under national law would make the Statute less acceptable to States 
which were susceptible on the subject of their domestic jurisdiction.”58  Another 
controversial question was how to ensure that the Courwould not be given 
jurisdiction over offenses that only one State or a small group of States viewed as 
international crimes.  Some participants argued that the Court should address only 
crimes that were clearly defined in conventions because customary internation l law 
was not sufficiently developed to be applied by the Court.  They believed that “only 
this restriction could ensure that the Court would serve its proper function of trying 
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57 Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction pp. 8-9. 
58 Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction p. 9. 
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offenses which could not be brought before national courts.  If the Court were given 
the possibility of having broader competence conferred upon it…States would be very 
adverse to creating the Court.”59  Other representatives found such restrictions 
unnecessary, because the “conferment of jurisdiction [by States] on the Court was a 
surrender of sovereignty which would not be made lightly or in fields where the law 
was not developed.”60   
Debate over questions regarding State acceptance of jurisdiction led to a draft 
Statute that prioritizes State sovereignty above international criminal prosecutions.  
The Statute envisions the Court acting only when States specifically consent to its 
jurisdiction, and lacking exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes covered by the Statute.  
Article 26 of the draft Statute directly addresses the “Attribution of Jurisdiction.”  Its 
first paragraph asserts that “Jurisdiction of the Court is not to be presumed,”61 thus 
highlighting the fact that no State will be bound by the jurisdiction of the Court unless 
that State specifically confers jurisdiction upon the Court by means of a convention, 
special agreement, or unilateral declaration.62  Au matic conferral of jurisdiction by a 
State becoming Party to the Statute was not an acceptable option.  Rather, “it was 
agreed that the Court, once created, would have no jurisdiction whatever unless States 
should confer that jurisdiction by means of an appropriate indication of intent.”63  
Moreover, as reflected in the draft Statute, a State is not bound to bring specific cases 
before the Court after conferring jurisdiction upon it.  Instead, a State could still 
choose to bring cases before its own national courts.  As the third paragraph of Article 
26 reads, “Conferment of jurisdiction signifies the right to seize the Court.”64  T us, 
although the international Court c ld gain jurisdiction over a particular crime if a 
State so desires, the mere conferment of jurisdiction will not guarantee this result.  
Moreover, the phrasing of the article is unambiguously intended “to avoid any 
implication that if a State conferred jurisdiction on the Court, that jurisdiction would 
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have to be exclusive rather than concurrent.”65  Paragraph four of Article 26 further 
dictates that “unless otherwise provided for in the instrument conferring jurisdiction 
upon the Court, the laws of a State determining national criminal jurisdiction shall not 
be affected by that conferment.”66  S ate sovereignty is also favored in Article 27, 
addressing the “Recognition of Jurisdiction,” which reads, “No person shall be tried 
before the Court unless jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court by the State or 
States of which he is a national and by the State or States in which the crime is alleged 
to have been committed.”67  This statement clearly intends to protect State sovereignty 
by assuring that no trial involving a review of national policy proceeds without State 
consent.  The article also seeks to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction between the 
International Criminal Court and national jurisdictions.  Although some States argued 
that this provision is an unnecessary limitation upon the activity of the Court, the 
Committee judged this requirement an essential safeguard without which the Statute 
was unlikely to be acceptable to many States.  Because the State where a crime is 
committed has a primary inteest in punishment of that crime due to a violation of its 
peace and order, that State’s consent is deemed a necessary precondition for the trial 
of an accused.68  Finally, it is assumed that States, rather than the Security Council or 
an independent Prosecutor, will have authority to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction.  
Article 29, entitled “Access to the Court,” outlines that “proceedings before the Court 
may be instituted by a State which has conferred jurisdiction upon the Court over such 
offenses as are involved in those proceedings.”69 A  the draft Statute existed in 1953, 
authority to refer a case to the Court rests solely with States themselves, not with the 
United Nations or with the Court’s Prosecutor. 
Although the term “complementarity” never appeared in this draft Statute, as 
early as 1953, the principle that would be known as complementarity in the 1998 
Rome Statute was developing.  As can be seen in the interrelated articles on the 
Court’s attribution of jurisdiction, recognition of jurisdiction, and a cess to the Court, 
an initial effort was underway to reach a functional compromise that could create an 
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institution with both adequate powers and sufficient State support to operate 
effectively, but not unduly impinge upon State sovereignty.  If an International
Criminal Court was created at this juncture, it would be an organ of those States 
affected, who would hold sole authority to refer cases to the Court, and whose specific 
consent would be required before the Court could exercise its own jurisdiction.  
Additionally, the Court would require consent of both the State of nationality of the 
accused and the territorial State before an individual could be tried.  Thus, the 
approach of the 1953 draft Statute reflects an effort to preserve classical notions of 
State sovereignty.  The balance of the proposed articles favors upholding traditional 
sovereignty at the expense of creating a collective international instrument that might 
provide a mechanism for prosecuting the most egregious offenders of human rights 
and humanitarian law.  States proved unwilling to compromise their national 
sovereignty so soon after the Second World War and the creation of the United 
Nations.  Lacking faith in the power of the international community to support an 
International Criminal Court, States preferred to protect their sovereign rights rather 
than defer to international criminal proceedings.  The Committee on International 
Criminal Jurisdiction approached the relationship between national and international 
jurisdiction by maintaining State primacy. 
 
The 1994 International Law Commission 
 The relationship between national courts and a potential International Criminal 
Court remained an unresolved issue at the 46th Session of the International Law 
Commission.  Some members envisaged a Court that would “supplement rather than 
supercede national jurisdiction,” while others felt the ICC should serve as an “option 
for prosecution when the States concerned were unwilling or unable to do so,” and yet 
a third group argued for granting the Court limited inherent jurisdiction over core 
crimes.70  Three different approaches to complementarity were thus considered by the 
ILC.  The first mirrors the system created in 1953, with the Court acting as an organ 
of States and only with their specific consent, reflecting a traditional conception of 
State sovereignty.  A second suggestion offers an intermediate approach that 
acknowledges an international constitutional interest in seeing crimes prosecuted.  
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While the primary responsibility to act continues to rest with States, the Court can 
assume jurisdiction when States prove unable or unwilling to proceed.  A third, 
broader approach, recognizes certain crimes for which an overwhelming international 
interest exists, and therefore grants the Court authority o prosecute through a type of 
inherent jurisdiction.  Paralleling many of the discussions held in 1953, various 
members of the ILC noted “the care required to draft an instrument that would be 
generally acceptable to States and provide for the establishment of a viable and 
effective institution.”71  The ILC hoped to successfully balance the concerns of States 
against the impetus to create a functional Court.  There was considerable debate as to 
whether the previous draft Statute “was not sufficientlyinternational or universal in 
its conception of the Court,” perhaps granting “too much prominence to inter-State 
relations rather than a direct relationship between the individual and the international 
community.”72  In contrast, other States felt the Commission should carefully “take 
into account current international realities, including the need to ensure coordination 
with the existing system of national jurisdiction and international cooperation, [and] 
that the establishment and effectiveness of the Court required the broad acceptance of 
the Statute by States which might require limiting its scope.”73  The tension between 
these two opposing views persisted as the ILC attempted to create a Court with 
sufficient authority to uphold international criminal law, while simultaneously 
protecting national sovereignty to garner the Court support from numerous States.  
 Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction and State acceptance of 
jurisdiction remained contentious.  As noted in the ILC commentary, Part Three of the 
draft Statute addressing jurisdiction “limits the range of cases which the Court may 
deal with, so as to restrict the operation of the Statute to the situations and purposes 
referred to in the preamble.”74  This was intended to secure the Court broade  State 
support by minimizing threats to national jurisdiction and State sovereignty.  The 
jurisdictional strategy of the ILC draft Statute was to distinguish between participation 
in and general support for the operation of the Court, versus specific State acceptance 
of the exercise of jurisdiction.  In revising the articles related to jurisdiction, some 
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members emphasized the importance of obtaining consent from the custodial State to 
ensure the presence of the accused at a trial, as well as the territorial S ate to facilitate 
the investigation and collection of evidence.  Others felt that this requirement was 
unduly restrictive and could prevent the Court from functioning and thereby facilitate 
impunity.75  With regard to preconditions for the exercise of ju isdiction, the ILC draft 
departs from previous draft Statutes by distinguishing genocide from all other crimes 
in Article 21.  The Court is granted inherent jurisdiction over genocide when a 
complaint is brought by a State Party that is also a contracting Party to the Genocide 
Convention.76  Thus, the Court will not require consent from other States Parties in 
order to prosecute the crime of genocide.  However, some delegations preferred that 
authority for criminal justice rest at a national level, and thought the Statute excessive 
in granting inherent jurisdiction over even genocide because “in the present state of 
the international community, the Court’s jurisdiction should be entirely consensual.”77  
Despite such objections, Article 21 is a significant step away from previous arguments 
privileging State sovereignty, and towards international community efforts to deliver 
justice for the most egregious violations of international law.  The paragraph on 
genocide demonstrates a new willingness to permit authority for criminal justice to be 
administered at the international level.  However, State sovereignty still remained a 
powerful force, as evidenced by the fact that with respect to all other crimes, the Court 
can only act with consent from both the custodial State and the territorial State.78  Yet 
some members of the Commission, again willing to compromise a degree of 
sovereignty in the interests of a more effective Court, expressed dissatisfaction with 
this consent-based system which they found “likely to frustrate [the Court’s] operation 
in many cases, and even to make the quest for an international criminal jurisdiction 
nugatory.”79  
With regard to State acceptance of jurisdiction, some members preferred an 
opt-out approach, questioning the value of becoming a State Party without accepting 
the Court’s jurisdiction.  They argued that such a system could create an inefficient 
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and weak institution.80  Others favored an opt-in approach that emphasizes the 
importance of States’ voluntary consent to the jurisdiction of the Court by 
distinguishing acceptance of the Statute from acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in 
specific cases or for limited categories of crimes.  This approach recognizes the 
Court’s dependence upon State cooperation and the need to limit the Court’s 
jurisdiction to cases where national courts are unable or unwilling to proceed, again 
reinforcing traditional notions of State sovereignty.  The final draft Statute grants 
jurisdiction in Article 22 under such an “opt-i ” system.81  Jurisdiction is not 
conferred automatically by a State becoming Party to the Statute, but rather requires a 
separate declaration, which can be general in character or limited to specific crimes.  
“A State Party to this Statute may: (a) At the time it expresses its consent to be bou d 
by the Statute, by declaration lodged with the depositary; or (b) At a later time, by 
declaration lodged with the Registrar; accept the jurisdiction of the Court.”82  If the 
consent of a non-Party State is required for a given case, that State can submit a 
declaration granting acceptance of jurisdiction on an ad h c basis.  The draft Statute is 
intended to ensure “that the Court will be complementary to national criminal justice 
systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be 
ineffective.”83  Thus, although the Court will be empowered to act when national 
jurisdictions fail to fulfill their obligations, the adoption of the opt-in approach clearly 
demonstrates that State sovereignty remains balanced against calls for international 
justice.  
The principle of complementarity is given a central position in the preamble of 
the 1994 ILC draft Statute in an effort to resolve some of the persistent tensions 
between State sovereignty and international criminal justice.  The third paragraph of 
the preamble notes that the Court is “intended to be complementary to national 
criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or 
may be ineffective.”84  The final phrase, “or may be ineffective,” clearly emphasizes 
the ILC’s belief that the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction should extend 
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beyond those occasions when national courts simply fail to function, to encompass 
situations where national jurisdictions might be unwilling to fulfill their obligation to 
genuinely render justice.  As the commentary to this article outlines, the Court is 
particularly “intended to operate in cases where there is no prospect of those persons 
being duly tried in national courts.  The emphasis is thus on the Court as a body which 
will complement existing national jurisdictions and existing procedures for 
international judicial cooperation in criminal matters and which is not intended to 
exclude the existing jurisdiction of national courts.”85  Although respecting State 
sovereignty remained a primary goal of the ILC, the principle of complementarity 
allows the authority of the Court to be expanded.  In this context, the role of 
international society in criminal prosecutions is broadened. 
Under the principle of complementarity, the ILC believed that the Court could 
exercise jurisdiction where a national system failed.  This provides the underlying 
premise of Article 35 of the draft Statute, which addresses the admissibility of cases.  
According to Article 35, a case may be in dmissible before the ICC 
on the ground that the crime in question:  
(a) Has been duly investigated by a State with jurisdiction over it, and the 
decision of that State not to proceed to a prosecution is apparently well-
founded;  
(b) Is under investigation by a State which has or may have jurisdiction over 
it, and there is no reason for the Court to take any further action for the 
time being with respect to the crime; or  
(c) Is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court.86  
  
This article allows the Court itself to decide when a case is admissible, and is based 
upon the suggestions of States hoping to limit the Court’s authority.  The first two 
subparagraphs ensure that the primary layer of responsibility for international criminal 
justice will be retained by States, and that an international interest in seeing crimes 
prosecuted only comes into effect when States fail to act.  Subparagraph C is 
explained “in terms of assuring that the Court would deal solely with the most serious 
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crimes, [and that] it would not encroach on the functions of national courts.”87 As 
demonstrated by this Article, the ILC approach does provide criteria for the Court’s 
intervention, even in cases where national authorities are acting.  However, primacy 
still rests with States, rather than with the international organ.  The responsibility for 
determining when to assume jurisdiction is placed with the Court in Article 24, which 
notes that the Court “must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought 
before it.”88  The presumption is clearly that the Court will defer to national 
jurisdictions as long as there is no compelling reason to do otherwise.  However, by 
allowing the Court to determine when a case will be admissible before it, a measure of 
State sovereignty is compr mised in order to better ensure the delivery of 
international justice.   
It is important to note the complex interrelationship between the different 
articles in this draft Statute, and the way in which the articles work together to create a 
regime of complementarity that limits the Court’s jurisdiction.  The preamble 
emphasizes that the Court is intended to exercise narrow jurisdiction “only over the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” and is to 
be “complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial 
procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.”89  The r mainder of the 
Statute, most specifically Part Three concerning jurisdiction, works to assure these 
terms are met.  Article 20 grants the Court subject matter jurisdiction over genocide, 
aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and treaty crimes that “constitute 
exceptionally serious crimes of international concern.”90  By carefully restricting 
subject matter jurisdiction  exclusively to core crimes, the preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction can be made slightly more flexible.  The provisions in Article 
21 consequently grant jurisdiction to the Court over genocide without the specific 
consent of any interested State.  However, an important constraint is placed on the 
Court in this context, because the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over genocide 
only if “a complaint is brought under Article 25, paragraph 1.”91  According to this 
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article, “a State Party which is also a Contracting Party to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 may lodge 
a complaint with the Prosecutor alleging that a crime of genocide appears to have 
been committed.”92  Before the Court can exercise its jurisdiction with regard to 
genocide, this draft Statute requires that a State Party that is also a Party to the 
Genocide Convention must lodge a complaint.  Therefore, despite the Court’s 
authority to act in the case of genocide without specific State a ceptanc  of 
jurisdiction, many additional limitations still restrain the Court to assure it 
complements, rather than supercedes, national jurisdictions.   
A similar network of criteria limits the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
crimes other than ge ocide and reinforces a commitment to State sovereignty.  Article 
21 outlines procedures for crimes other than genocide.  The Court can exercise its 
jurisdiction only when “a complaint is brought under Article 25, paragraph 2, and the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect of the crime is accepted under Article 22: (i) By 
the State which has custody of the suspect with respect to the crime; (ii) By the State 
on the territory of which the act or omission in question occurred.”93  It is noteworthy 
that this draft of Article 21 omits any requirement that the State of the nationality of 
the accused grant its consent.  The Court must instead earn the acceptance of both the 
custodial and the territorial State.  First, a complaint must be brought under Article 
25(2), which requires that “a State Party which accepts the jurisdiction of the Court 
under Article 22 with respect to a crime may lodge a complaint with the Prosecutor 
alleging that such a crime appears to have been committed.”94  Thus, only a complaint 
brought by a State Party that accepts the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime in 
question will free the Court to exercise its jurisdiction.  Additionally, acceptance of 
jurisdiction as outlined in Article 22 is not inherent but rather depends upon a specific 
declaration by the State expressing its consent to be bound by the Statute.95  Finally, 
even if all the terms of Article 21 granting the Court the authority to exercise its 
jurisdiction are satisfied, the Court must still convince itself that the case is admissible 
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under the terms of Article 35.  As is clearly demonstrated by this regime, there may 
exist situations where the Court is able to exercise jurisdiction when national Courts 
prove unable to act.  However, the primary responsibility for international crminal 
justice continues to rest with States, and the Statute is drafted to ensure that the Court 
cannot supercede national jurisdictions. 
Complementarity as envisioned in 1994 by the ILC began to increase the 
prospects for international criminal prosecutions by allowing the Court to act when 
national jurisdictions fail to render meaningful justice.  A more intermediate approach 
to complementarity is adopted by the ILC in this draft Statute, which acknowledges 
an international constitutional interest in seeing cor  crimes prosecuted.  While the 
primary responsibility for criminal justice still rests with States, another layer of 
authority, at the international level, exists when States prove unable or unwilling to 
investigate and prosecute. 
 
The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee 
 The Ad Hoc Committee provided a forum where States could comment upon 
and critique the ILC draft Statute.  The principle of complementarity quickly 
resurfaced as a major issue and was described as “an essential element in the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court.  It was, however, also viewed as 
calling for further elaboration so that its implications for the substantive provisions of 
the draft Statute could be fully understood.”96  States immediately “emphasized that 
the proposed Court should be established as a body whose jurisdiction would 
complement that of national courts and existing procedures for international judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, and that its jurisdiction should be limited to the most 
serious crimes of concer  to the international community as a whole.”97  Many 
delegations interpreted the language of the third preambular paragraph on 
complementarity from the ILC draft “as clearly indicating that the International Law 
Commission did not intend the proposed Court to replace national courts.”98  These 
delegations stressed that the principle of complementarity “should create a strong 
presumption in favor of national jurisdiction,” noting that States retained a vital 
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interest in remaining “responsible and accountable f r prosecuting violations of their 
laws—which also served the interest of the international community, inasmuch as 
national systems would be expected to maintain and enforce adherence to 
international standards of behavior within their own jurisdiction.”99  Other delegations 
countered that while national courts should retain concurrent jurisdiction, the ICC 
“should always have primacy.”100  A middle view also emerged, suggesting “it was 
important not only to safeguard the primacy of national jurisdictions, b t also t  avoid 
the jurisdiction of the Court becoming merely residual to national jurisdiction.”101 
Thus, a critical question for the Ad Hoc Committee remained where primary 
responsibility for international criminal prosecution would reside.  Some delegations 
felt that authority rested with States themselves, and asserted that the Court could only 
act subject to specific State acceptance of jurisdiction, and when States proved unable 
or unwilling.  In contrast, other States, recognizing the shared interest of the 
international community in prosecuting gross violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law, argued that authority to intervene could rest at the international 
level, with less stringent requirements for State consent.  The principle of 
complementarity was thus intimately tied to many highly contested articles of the 
draft Statute, and to any eventual compromise that would be reached.  Discussion 
focused on the definition of complementarity within the context of the Statute, and the 
details of how complementarity would function through various articles to balance the 
tension between national sovereignty and international justice. 
The principle of complementarity is directly related to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court.  At the Ad Hoc Committee’s first meeting, the great majority 
of speakers supported the ILC draft proposal granting the Court inherent jurisdiction 
over genocide, so debate revolved around whether the Court should also possess 
inherent jurisdiction over other core crimes.  The ILC’s approach to inherent 
jurisdiction was criticized as too restrictive, and it was suggested that the sphere of 
inherent jurisdiction should be broadened to cover war crimes, serious violations of 
the laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity.  Extending inherent 
jurisdiction over core crimes was considered necessary for the Court to fulfill its 
purpose, again showing a new willingness to support greater authority for criminal 
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justice at the international level.  Moreover, the ILC’s approach w s viewed as 
lagging behind current international law, since it made possible the exclusion of rules 
of jus cogens character from the Court’s jurisdiction.102  Some delegations thus 
asserted that “the principle of complementarity required that the draft Satute provide 
for a single legal system for all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”103  
However, such a legal system would be acceptable only if the jurisdiction of the Court 
was strictly limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.  As a result, restricting the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Court to genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of the 
laws and customs of war was proposed.   
The Ad Hoc Committee, aware of the interr lation between various provisions 
of the Statute, noted that the acceptance of such a proposal would also simplify the 
problem of State consent to the exercise of jurisdiction and “promote broad 
acceptance of the Court by States and thereby enhance its ffectiv ness.”104  In this 
respect, many delegations commenting on Article 22 of the ILC draft, regarding the 
acceptance of jurisdiction, felt that inherent jurisdiction should be favored over an 
opt-in approach which “leaned too much on the side of conervatism to the detriment 
of the interests of the international community and might leave the Court with a very 
narrow field of competence and thus run counter to the general aim of the Statute.”105 
Predictably, other delegations still supported an opt-in appr ach to promote broader 
acceptance of the Statute and better protect State sovereignty.  Parallel disagreements 
persisted about the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.  Some States felt the 
terms of the ILC’s draft Article 21, requiring consent fr m both the custodial and the 
territorial State before the Court could exercise jurisdiction over crimes other than 
genocide, were balanced and consistent with complementarity.  Other delegations 
argued that Article 21 should be limited to consent from just the territorial State, while 
still others wanted to expand the scope of the article to include the State of nationality 
of the victim and the State of nationality of the accused.106 
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The question of State acceptance of jurisdiction was therefore central to 
States’ reactions the Statute.  Under a system of inherent jurisdiction, any State that 
signs the Statute will automatically accept the Court’s power to try an accused for 
crimes covered under inherent jurisdiction, without additional consent from any State
Party.  However, some delegations emphasized that “inherent jurisdiction did not 
mean exclusive jurisdiction and would not strip States Parties of the power to exercise 
jurisdiction at the national level, and that the question of priority of jurisdiction would 
have to be resolved by the International Criminal Court on the basis of the principle of 
complementarity.”107   Not surprisingly, some States objected to the inclusion of 
inherent jurisdiction as “incompatible with the principle of State sovereignty a  
embodied in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.”108  The 
concept of inherent jurisdiction was also considered “inconsistent with the principle of 
complementarity, under which the Court was only intended to have jurisdiction wh re 
the trial procedures at the national level were unavailable or would not be effective.  
The point was made in this connection that instead of assuming a priori that certain 
categories of crimes were better suited for trial by an International Criminal C urt, it 
would be preferable to determine the circumstances when trial by such a Court was 
appropriate.”109  Thus, many States resisted acknowledging an overwhelming 
international interest in prosecuting core crimes and objected to placing authority with 
an international organ granted inherent jurisdiction over crimes other than genocide.  
In contrast to these views, other delegations asserted that 
inherent jurisdiction could not be viewed as incompatible with State 
sovereignty since it would stem from an act of sovereignty, namely, 
acceptance of the Statute…. The crimes under consideration were crimes of 
international concern, the prosecution of which would be of interest to a 
number of States, if not to the international community as a whole, and…in 
case the custodial State was unable to prosecute, insistence on sovereignty 
would affect the legitimate interests of other States…. The alternative 
solution—subordinating the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court to a 
declaration of acceptance—would leave the future fate of the Court in the 
hands of States on whose discretion the ability of the Court to operate would 
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depend…. Such an approach, apart from enabling States to manipulate the 
functioning of the Court, would set aside the interests of the international 
community—which could not be reduced to the sum total of the States 
forming part of it—and would prevent the Court from playing its role as the 
guardian of international public order.110 
 
With reference to the argument that inherent jurisdiction interfered with the p inciple 
of complementarity, these delegations argued that 
inherent jurisdiction was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that the Court would 
have concurrent jurisdiction, i.e., would only intervene when it appeared to the 
Court, on the basis of criteria to be clearly established in the Statute, that 
national courts could not function adequately….The effect of the principle of 
complementarity could only be, at most, to defer the intervention of the Court, 
whereas rejection of the inherent jurisdiction concept would result in the 
Courts complete inability ab initio to be seized of a case.111 
 
Thus, despite the strong impetus to protect State sovereignty, many delegations felt 
creating a viable Court required accepting inherent jurisdiction over all core crim s.  
Expanding the sphere of inherent jurisdiction would “have less far-reaching 
consequences [in impinging upon State sovereignty] than might appear inasmuch as, 
for the Court to have jurisdiction over the crimes concerned, the complaint State, the 
territorial State, and the custodial State would all have to be parties to the Statute” 
under the terms of Articles 21 and 22.112  Many States thus favored an international 
constitutional approach through which the Court would acquire authority to act at the 
international level, rather than placing sole authority for criminal prosecution with 
States.  From this perspective, it was desirable to incorporate all core crimes into a 
system of inherent jurisdiction due to their gravity and the associated international 
interest in seeing such crimes prosecuted, as well as “the desirability of including 
them…if the new institution was to provide an adequate judicial answer to the 
concerns to which its creation was intended to respond.”113 
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The nature of the exceptions to the exercise of national jurisdiction, and the 
issue of admissibility before the Court, were also debated with vigor.  Many 
delegations felt that the terms “unavailable” and “ineffective” employed to stipulate 
when the Court could assume jurisdiction were ambiguous, as were the standards for 
determining when a national system would meet those criteria.  In this context, “the 
observation was made that the commentary to the preamble clearly envisaged a very 
high threshold for exceptions to national jurisdiction an  that the International Law 
Commission only expected the International Criminal Court to operate in cases in 
which there was no prospect that alleged perpetrators of serious crimes would be duly 
tried in national courts.”114  Thus, Article 35 of the ILC draft was criticized as too 
permissive, and proposals were made to further restrict the ICC’s ability to find a case 
admissible.  In this respect, suggestions were offered that “the presumption in Article 
35 of the draft Statute should be reversed so that decisions of acquittal or conviction 
by national courts or decisions by national prosecution authorities not to prosecute 
were respected except where they were not well-founded.”115  Additionally, States 
“stressed that the standards set by the Commission were not i tended to establish a 
hierarchy between the International Criminal Court and national courts, or to allow 
the International Criminal Court to pass judgment on the operation of national courts 
in general.”116  Thus, while the draft Statute might provide for the possibility that a 
State voluntarily relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the international court, States 
clearly remained deeply concerned about protecting their sovereignty and preventing 
the ICC from becoming a court of review over national proceedings.117  As a result, 
with regard to Article 35, some argued that “the principle of complementarity should 
be reflected more clearly in the form of a precondition [to the exercise of jurisdiction] 
to ensure that the Court would not interfere with the leg imate investigative activities 
of national authorities or exercise jurisdiction when a State was willing and able to do 
so.”118  It was agreed that when national authorities failed to act with respect to a 
crime contained within the draft Statute, the Court should be permitted to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  However, several delegations asserted that in all other cases “the 
decision on whether national jurisdiction should be set aside should be made on a 
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case-by-case basis…. While the jurisdiction of an international court was compelling 
where there was no functioning [national] judicial system, the intervention of the 
Court in situations where an operating national judicial system was being used as a 
shield [for the accused] required very careful consid ration.”119   
With regard to preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, some delegations 
wanted to expand the category of States able to trigger jurisdiction, such that “any 
State Party to the Statute should be entitled to lodge a complain with the Prosecutor 
with respect to the serious crimes under general international law that were of concern 
to the international community as a whole,” specifically crimes within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Court under Article 20.120  In contrast, others favored 
restrictions to avoid abuse based upon political considerations, and to limit the 
jurisdictional reach of the Court in the event that inherent jurisdiction over all core 
crimes was granted.  Thus, some States voiced serious reservations about proposals 
that the UN Security Council be allowed to refer matters to the Court without any 
requirement for State consent.  Additionally, at this stage it was first suggested that 
the Prosecutor should have the right to an independent investigation proprio motu.  
“The role of the Prosecutor should be more fully elaborated and expanded to include 
the initiation of investigation or prosecution in the case of serious crimes under 
general international law that were of concern to the international community as a 
whole in the absence of a complaint….This expanded role would enhance the 
independence and autonomy of the Prosecutor, who would be in a position to work on 
behalf of the international community rather than a particular complaint State.”121  
Thus, some States clearly favored placing greater authority for prosecuting crimes 
with the Court at the international level, and envisaged the ICC as an institution that 
would not be rigidly bound by referrals and consent from States. 
Although many States represented at the Ad Hoc Committee continued to 
place great importance upon maintaining State sovereignty, their willingness to 
discuss the principle of complementarity was clear and significant.  In this context, 
debate focused upon balancing a vision of complementarity that locates responsibility 
for international criminal jurisdiction with national courts against a conception of 
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complementarity that vests greater authority at the international level and permits the 
ICC to act when national systems fail to fulfill their obligations.  
 
The 1996-1998 Preparatory Commission 
  From the start of Preparatory Commission meetings in 1996, it was “generally 
agreed that a proper balance” between the International Criminal Court and national 
authorities “was crucial in drafting a Statute th  would be acceptable to a large 
number of States.”122  However, widely divergent views still existed regarding the 
best method for resolving the tensions.  Conscious of State sovereignty, some 
delegations felt complementarity should expressly reflect the intention that the Court 
operate “in cases where there was no prospect of persons who had been accused of the 
crimes listed in the Statute being duly tried in national courts; but such a Court was 
not intended to exclude the existing jurisdiction of naal courts.”123  Thus, 
establishment of a Court should in no way diminish the responsibility of States to 
vigorously investigate and prosecute.  These delegations urged that complementarity 
would need  
to be taken into account at each point at which the respective roles of the Court 
and national authorities can or do coincide.  From this perspective, it is not a 
question of the Court having primary or even concurrent jurisdiction.  Rather, 
its jurisdiction should be understood as having an exceptional character.  
There may be instances where the Court could obtain jurisdiction quickly over 
a case because no good-faith effort was under way at the national level to 
investigate or prosecute the case, or no credible national justice system even 
existed to consider the case.  But as long as the relevant national system was 
investigating or prosecuting a case in good faith, according to this view, the 
Court’s jurisdiction should not come into operation.124 
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Most delegations agreed that while the reference to complementarity in the 
preamble should remain, a more explicit definition of the concept enumerating its 
constituent elements should also be included.  The proposal that was eventually 
incorporated into the new draft Statute in 1996 added one significant paragraph to the 
preamble.  To reinforce the role of States in upholding international criminal law, this 
new paragraph read, “Recognizing that it is the primary duty of States to bring to 
justice persons responsible for such serious crimes.”125  Additionally, the nxt 
paragraph was modified to emphasize that the Court “is intended to be 
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such systems may 
be ineffective and/or in cases where national jurisdiction is unavailable.”126  By 1998 
this preambular paragraph had been refined to declare that the Court “is intended to be 
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial 
procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.”127  Articl  1 was also revised 
from the ILC draft in order to accentuate the principle of complementarity.  The 1996 
draft of this article reads, in part, “[t]here is established an International Criminal 
Court which shall be complementary to national criminal justice systems.”128  By 
1998 this had been refi ed further to highlight that the Court “shall have the power to 
bring persons to justice for the most serious crimes of international concern, and 
which shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”129  Thus, while still 
enunciating the principle of complementarity, this revision also emphasizes that the 
subject matter of the Court will be strictly limited. 
 The Preparatory Committee discussed the issue of State acceptance of 
jurisdiction again in 1996.  While a vocal minority continued to favor an opt-in 
scheme, a shift had occurred since the ILC deliberations.  The majority of delegations 
now supported inherent jurisdiction over all core crimes, rather than simply genocide, 
and felt that the treatment of jurisdiction in Articles 21 and 22 of the ILC draft Statute 
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was insufficient.  Willingness to compromise State sovereignty in an effort to grant 
the Court more authority became evident, as many States favored a regime in which 
the Court would not require specific State consent to exercise jurisdiction. Instead, 
the action of becoming Party to the Statute would automatically confer State 
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.  Article 21, addressing preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction, was thus revised and presented as a series of alternative 
suggestions.   In one proposal for Article 21, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction 
over core crimes when the UN Security Council refers the matter under Chapter VII, 
when interested States refer the matter in accordance with Article 25, or when the 
Prosecutor has been notified and determines there exists sufficient evidence for 
prosecution under Articles 26 and 27.  If the Security Council does not refer the case, 
the relevant States must accept the Court’s jurisdiction according to the terms of
Article 22, national jurisdictions must be unavailable or ineffective, or the matter must 
be deferred to the Court by the relevant State.130  Another option for Article 21 
proposes that the Court exercise its jurisdiction only when a complaint is brought 
under Article 25 and only with the acceptance of both the custodial and the territorial 
States.131  A third proposal deletes the independent role of the Prosecutor, stipulating 
that the Court exercise its jurisdiction only when a referral is made by the Security
Council under Chapter VII or by a State Party.132 Tied to these revisions of Article 21 
was a new proposal for Article 22, which differs from the ILC draft by declaring that 
a State “which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the inherent jurisdiction 
of the Court” with respect to core crimes, but still allows for an opt-in regime for 
treaty crimes if those remain within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.133  As 
noted in the PrepComm report, “this meaning of inherent jurisdiction, some 
delegations felt, was fully compatible with respect for State sovereignty, since States 
would have expressed their consent at the time of ratification of the Statute as 
opposed to having to express it in respect of every single crime listed in the Statute at 
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different stages.”134  Other delegations, sensitive to protecting State sovereignty, 
pointed out that a regime of inherent jurisdiction does not “imply that the Court, in all 
circumstances, had a better claim than national courts to exercise jurisdiction.  It was 
therefore possible that a case could arise in relations to a crime which was within the 
Court’s inherent jurisdiction but which would nonetheless be tried by a national 
jurisdiction.”135  Some States expressed extreme reservations about inherent 
jurisdiction and believed that an opt-i regime was more likely to maximize State 
participation.  “In their view, this approach was also consistent with the principle of 
sovereignty.”136 
 Closely tied to questions of State acceptance of jurisdiction is the trigger 
mechanism, specifically whether States Parties, the Security Council, or an 
independent Prosecutor will have power to initiate an investigation by the Court.  
Some delegations requested deletion of Article 23(1), which reads “the Court has 
jurisdiction in accordance with the Statute with respect to crimes referred to in Article 
20 as a consequence of the referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”137  These States 
argued that Security Council referral would compromise the Court’s independence by 
politicizing a judicial body and “dispense with the requirements of Article 21 [on 
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction] as well as complementarity and the 
sovereign equality of States.”138  Delegations that favored retaining Article 23(1) 
believed that the Council’s referral should activate mandatory jurisdiction in a manner 
similar to the ad hoc tribunals, and felt such referral “would not impair the 
independence of the Court because the Prosecutor would be free to decide whether 
there was sufficient evidence to indict a particular individual for a crime.”139  Thus, 
with respect to Security Council referral, some States argued that authority for 
criminal jurisdiction be located at the in ernational layer with the ICC, rather than 
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with national jurisdictions.  With respect to referral by States, some delegations 
asserted that only the territorial State, custodial State, State of nationality of the 
accused, and State of nationality of the victim should be able to lodge a complaint to 
trigger the Court’s jurisdiction.  Others objected to this rigorous standard for State 
referral, and noted “that the crimes under the Statute were, by their nature, of concern 
to the international community as a whole…. The jurisdiction of the Court would only 
be engaged if some government failed to fulfill its obligations to prosecute an 
international crime; then, in their view, all States Parties would become interested 
parties.”140  Again, these States asserted an overwhelming international interest in 
seeing perpetrators brought to justice at the international level, if necessary.  In 
contrast, other delegations felt that States permitted to lodge a complaint should be 
Parties to the Statute and also have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 22 
with respect to the crime that was being referred, or be parties to the Genocide 
Convention if referring a case of genocide.141  The issue of inherent jurisdiction over 
all core crimes versus only over genocide thus reemerged under this proposal, because 
if inherent jurisdiction existed with reference to all core crimes, any State Party would 
be authorized to make a complaint about any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.  This would again grant the Court much greater authority to act.  Additionally, 
many States found the role of the Prosecutor in Article 25 too restricted.  Fearing that 
States or the Security Council “for a variety of political reasons would be unlikely to 
lodge a complaint,” these delegations argued that “the Prosecutor should therefore be 
empowered to initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained 
from any source.”142  Others could not agree to the notion of an independent 
Prosecutor authorized to initiate proceedings.  In their view, “such an independent 
power would lead to politicization of the Court and allegations that the Prosecutor had 
acted for political motives.  This would undermine the credibility of the Court.”143 
Additionally, some delegations opined “dev lopments in international law had yet to 
reach a stage where the international community as a whole was prepared to empower 
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the Prosecutor to initiate investigations.  It was unrealistic to seek to expand the 
Prosecutor’s role…if widespread acceptance of the C urt was to be achieved.”144  
Thus, deeply conflicting views about whether authority to trigger the Court’s 
jurisdiction would rest at the national level with States or at the international level 
with an independent Prosecutor persisted in 1996. 
 When the PrepComm draft Statute was again revised in 1998, many of these 
issues remained unresolved.  For example, in draft Article 6, the Court remains able to 
exercise jurisdiction when a State Party refers a case under the terms of Article 11.  
However, there was no agreement about Security Council referral under Chapter VII 
or referral by an independent Prosecutor under Article 12, although these options were 
incorporated into the draft Article.145  Similarly, one draft of Article 7, regarding 
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, outlines that with referral by a State Party 
or the Prosecutor, the Court can exercise jurisdiction if one or a combination of the 
following States accepts the Court’s jurisdiction: the custodial State, the territorial 
State, the State that requested the surrender of the accused, the national State of the 
victim, or the national State of the accused.146  However, it remained undecided which 
of these States should be included in a final article, and whether only one or a 
combination of States would need to consent.  Another draft of Article 7 begins with a 
paragraph declaring “a State which becomes a Party to the Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.”147  From a 
premise of inherent jurisdiction, this option then requires consent from, at minimum, 
the territorial State.  This draft Article also considers requiring consent from the 
custodial State in addition to the territorial State, or solely from either State.148 Wit  
regard to draft Article 9, one version mandates that “a State which becomes a Party to 
the Statute thereby accepts the inherent jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the 
crimes referred to in Article 5,” or alternatively for only core crimes.149  Another 
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option still preserves the opt-in regime, requiring a declaration of either general or 
limited application to be lodged before a State accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.150  
Moreover, the entirety of Article 12, which considers granting the Prosecutor an ex 
officio or proprio motu power to initiate investigations, is included as an option that 
might later be deleted.151  Thus, although many revisions were made in the 
PrepComm draft Statute in 1998, most were not universally agreed upon.  Almost all 
the articles are presented as multiple options from which to choose, with many articles 
subject to editing or removal pending the final decisions of the Commission. 
The most substantial change adopted by the PrepComm in 1998 was the 
creation draft Article 15 on issues of admissibility.  This article, which replaced ILC 
Article 35, intends to preserve the principle of complementarity and to protect State 
sovereignty with regard to criminal justice, and sets very specific and rigorous 
standards for the admissibility of a case before the ICC.  It is notable that this draft 
article is clean, meaning it has no bracketed clauses inviting additional debate, with 
the exception of the first paragraph that had not been considered during informal 
consultations.  The need to create a clean draft article highlights the extraordinary 
difficulty of the issues surrounding admissibility.  Many feared the fragile 
compromises that had been reached would collapse and further efforts to create a 
workable Statute would terminate without a clean article addressing admissibility. 
From the beginning of the PrepComm stage, ILC definitions for admissibility 
based upon situations in which national jurisdictions “may not be available or may be 
ineffective” were criticized as both overly obscu e and intrusive.152  Some States 
feared that “without specifying clear exceptions to the concept, complementarity 
would render the Court meaningless by undermining its authority.”153  T ese 
delegations believed that requiring the Court to prove the admissibili y of every case  
would reduce it to a mere residual institution, short of necessary status and 
independence.  In this context it was noted that while national authorities and 
courts had the primary responsibility for prosecuting the perpetrators of the 
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crimes listed in the Statute, the Court was an indispensable asset in enhancing 
the prevention of impunity, which too often had been the reward for violators 
of human rights and humanitarian law.  While attempts should be made to 
minimize the risk of the Court dealing with a matter that could eventually be 
dealt with adequately on the national level, it was, according to this view, still 
preferable to the risk of perpetrators of serious crimes being protected by 
sympathetic national judiciaries or authorities.154 
 
Thus, Article 35 of the ILC draft was denounced as too narrow, and proposals were 
offered to expand the article to cover cases that had been or were in the process of 
being prosecuted at the national level.  According to this logic, the ICC should be able 
to intervene when national efforts are clearly sham trials intended to protect, rather 
than prosecute, the perpetrators.  In contrast, other delegations felt that the subjectivity 
of the proposed criteria would infringe upon State sovereignty, and emphasized th  
difficulty of assessing when national procedures are unavailable or ineffective.155  
These delegations requested that an additional requirement for the Court to establish 
jurisdiction be added to the complementarity article.  Thus, it was proposed th t the 
article be re-titled “Concurrent jurisdiction,” and outline the occasions when the Court 
would have no jurisdiction under the Statute.   
At the same time, most delegations recognized that failing to include the 
concept of “unwillingness” could allow States to obstruct the Court’s jurisdiction by 
initiating investigations and prosecutions intended to lead to impunity for the accused.  
As the definition of unwillingness was clarified, States grew more comfortable with 
the approach likely to be adopted.  With regard to the definitions of “inability” and 
“unwillingness,” some delegations believed the matter of being unable to prosecute 
entirely self-evident.  They argued that while various factors might contribute to a 
State’s inability to prosecute, if a State failed to exercise its jurisdiction by initiating 
an investigation that would provide adequate basis for permitting the ICC to act.  
Others feared this argument would give the Court dangerously wide discretion, thus 
leading to the necessity of fully defining the term “inability.”  The most important 
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factor relevant to a State’s ability to act was determined to be the partial or complete 
collapse of the national judicial system.  This includes the extent to which the State is 
exercising effective control over its territory, and the existence of a functioning law 
enforcement mechanism that allows the State to secure the accused as well as 
necessary evidence and testimony.  These criteria became the basis for establishing 
“inability.”  Defining unwillingness proved more complex because many delegations 
were sensitive to the fact that the ICC might function as a court of appeal over 
national proceedings.  Because States argued strongly against any subjective 
definitions, the phrase “apparently well-found d” used by the ILC to describe the 
nature of national prosecutions was deemed unacceptable, as were alternatives 
including “effectively,” “good faith,” and “diligently.”  The term with the most 
objective meaning was deemed to be “genuinely,” and this was the adverb adopted.156  
In order to determine whether a national trial is not genuine, the Court needs to 
establish that the proceedings are undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the 
person,” or that there is an “undue delay…inconsistent with an intent to bri g the 
person concerned to justice.”157 
The result of these lengthy debates about complementarity and admissibility 
was the creation of draft Article 15.  This article reads, “having regard to paragraph 3 
of the preamble” which outlines that the Court must complement national 
jurisdictions, the Court shall determine a case is inadmissible where  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and 
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely 
to prosecute;  
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
paragraph 2 of Article 18;  
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(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.158 
 
To further guarantee that the ICC will only act to supplement, rather than supplant, 
national jurisdictions, this article also defines how the Court is to determine 
unwillingness and inability.  A State will be considered unwilling if 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was 
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as set out in 
Article 5; 
(b) There has been an undue delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice.159 
 
In order to determine inability, the Court is instructed to consider whether “due to a 
total or partial collapse of or unavailability of its national justice system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings.”160  However, several qualifying provisions were 
still needed to build a workable consensus.  A text box was placed at the beginningof
the draft article to explain its origins, which reads, in part, “The content of the text 
represents a possible way to address the issue of complementarity and is without 
prejudice to the views of any delegation.  The text does not represent agreement on 
the eventual content or approach to be included in this article.”161  Clearly, the issues 
of admissibility embodied in this article remained controversial and unresolved.  As a 
                                               
158 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Article 15(1). 
159 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Article 15(2). 
160 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Article 15(3). 
161 Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee, August 4 to 15, 1997, A/AC.249/1997/L/L.8/Rev.1, 
1997, annex 1 [hereinafter PrepComm Decisions]. 
  50
result, a number of footnotes were inserted to explain the drafting methods, and many 
refer to the fact that provisions of the final version depend upon the outcome of 
negotiations about other sections of the Statute.  Additionally, another proviso is 
included at the end of the draft article, which notes as an alternative that “the Court 
shall not have the power to intervene when a national decision has been taken in a 
particular case.  That approach could be reflected as follows: The Court has no 
jurisdiction where the case in question is being investigated or prosecuted, or has been 
prosecuted, by a State that has jurisdiction over it.”162  This option again reinforces 
the persistence of arguments that favor vesting authority for international criminal 
justice at a national level. 
 Therefore, the draft Statute presented by the Preparatory Commission to the 
Rome Conference took significant steps towards defining the principle of 
complementarity in the context of the Court’s jurisdiction.  State sovereignty was 
compromised in key articles in order to grant the Court more authority, yet support for 
the terms of the draft Statute remained relatively strong.  Yet the passionate and 
combative nature of the debate over these issues, as well as the challenge of reaching 
a universally accepted compromise on complementarity, signaled that much work was 
still needed to create a Statute that could eventually be adopted. 
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CHAPTER THREE: COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE  
 
Introduction 
 The most contentious issue at Rome was how to assure primary responsibility 
for criminal prosecution remain d with national courts yet still grant the ICC 
sufficient authority to assume jurisdiction over crimes of international concern when 
States prove unable or unwilling to act.  At times, divergent views on many of the 
central provisions of the Statute appeared irreconcilable.  The complexity of the 
interrelated jurisdictional issues defied a simple solution.  However, by balancing the 
tension between State sovereignty and international criminal jurisdiction, 
complementarity made compromise possible and allowed the Statute to be adopted.  
This chapter will therefore examine the principle of complementarity as it emerges in 
various articles of the Rome Statute.  
 
Complementarity in the Preamble 
 The principle of complementarity first appears in the preamble of th  Rome 
Statute.  This mirrors the ILC draft, which emphasizes in the second preambular 
paragraph that the Court “is intended to exercise jurisdiction over only the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” and in the third 
paragraph mentions complementarity “to national criminal justice systems in cases 
where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.”163  I  1995, 
the Ad Hoc Committee also included a reference to complementarity, noting that the 
third preambular paragraph clarifies that the ILC “did not intend the proposed Court 
to replace national courts.”164  The Preparatory Committee was also well aware of the 
dispute over the principle of complementarity, and proposed language for the 
preamble stating “that it is the primary duty of States to bring to justice persons 
responsible for such serious crimes.”165  The delegations at the Rome Conference 
were cognizant of the legal significance and political importance of the language 
defining complementarity in he preamble.  The ILC had previously noted, in its 1994 
commentary, that the preamble will “assist in the interpretation and application of the 
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Statute, and in particular in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 35” which 
addresses issues of admissibility.166  The Ad Hoc Committee also recognized that the 
terms of the preamble form “part of the context in which the Statute as a whole was to 
be interpreted and applied.”167   
Thus, although the preamble is not an operative part of the Rome Statute, it 
nevertheless introduces the main purposes of the Statute and reiterates both the 
obligations of States and the role of the Court.  Paragraph six of the preamble, which 
reads “recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes,”168 affirms that States Parties have a 
duty to undertake national investigations and prosecutions for the most serious crimes 
in international law.  It reminds the international community that without action by 
States, the duty to prosecute will be transferred to the Court under complementarity.  
The tenth preambular paragraph provides the first explicit reference to 
complementarity, “emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established 
under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,”169 thus 
demonstrating that complementarity is an essential component of the Court’s 
jurisdictional system.  This paragraph also lays the foundation for further 
development of complementarity in Article 17, which clarifies that national 
jurisdictions will hold primacy and the ICC will only supplement these efforts when a 
State is unable and unwilling to proceed.  Primary responsibility for enforcing 
international law therefore rests with States Par ies, not the Court.  The first article of 
the Statute, outlining the Court’s establishment, also reflects the principle of 
complementarity, stating that the Court “shall be a permanent institution and shall 
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions.”170  Although the concept of complementarity is not 
expanded upon in this article, the principle is addressed in greater detail in Articles 12 
through 15 and 17 through 18.   
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Complementarity in Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
 Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction are addressed in Article 12, a d 
are fundamental to creating an effective Court under a regime of complementarity.171  
Not surprisingly, this article was one of the most controversial negotiated at Rome.  It 
is closely tied to Article 5 on subject matter jurisdiction, Article 13 on the exercise of 
jurisdiction, and Article 17 on admissibility, which together confront the related 
jurisdictional issues before the Court and attempt to protect State sovereignty while 
preserving the Court’s ability to take necessary action.  From the ILC to the 
PrepComm and throughout the Rome Conference, a fundamental question was 
whether, in cases not referred by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, the 
ICC would be granted inherent jurisdiction over core crimes listed in the Statute.  A 
related issue was whether specific State consent would be a precondition for the 
exercise of jurisdiction, and if so, which States’ acceptance would be required. 
 The drafting history of Article 12 demonstrates the diversity of views 
regarding State consent and inherent jurisdiction.  The 1994 ILC draft Statute focuses 
on creating a Court that would operate on a restrictive consent basis, and under strict 
Security Council control.  The ILC approach clearly favors State sovereignty by 
allowing the Court to intervene only with specific consent from interested States, 
rather than whenever required to protect the interests of the greater international 
community.  As a result, the ILC was criticized for creating a regime that, in its 
deference to State sovereignty, could completely cripple the pro osed Court.  
Although the crimes under ICC jurisdiction were broader than those encompassed 
under the Rome Statute, inherent jurisdiction was granted only in the case of 
genocide.172  In the case of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression, the 
                                               
171 This Article reads,  
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.  
2. In the case of Article 13, paragraphs (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more 
of the following States are P ties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 
accordance with paragraph 3: 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registraion of tha  vessel or aircraft. 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State 
may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with 
respect to the crime in question.  The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay 
or exception in accordance with Part 9. 
172 Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, Report of th  International Law Commission, 
Article 21. 
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Court could act only when both the custodial State and the territorial State accepted 
the Court’s jurisdiction.173  Moreover, the consent of States Parties was granted under 
an opt-in system in which a State could specify categories of crimes for which it 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, the Court was not granted inherent 
jurisdiction based upon a State ratifying the Statute.  Instead, a special declaration in 
which a State specifically accepted the Court’s jurisdiction was required.174  Th  same 
fundamental questions about ICC jurisdiction subsequently arose before the Ad Hoc 
and Preparatory Committees.  Within the PrepComm, widespread support for inherent 
jurisdiction over genocide prevailed, but views differed as to whether war crimes and 
crimes against humanity should also be covered under a regime of inherent 
jurisdiction.  Those opposed to such measures, although aware of the gravity of the 
crimes, focused on the importance of protecting State sovereignty and the need to 
obtain maximum State support.  Some delegations therefore argued that the consent of 
both the State of nationality of the accused and of the victim should be secured, in 
addition to the consent of the custodial and territorial States, before the Court could 
exercise its jurisdiction.   
By the time the Committee of the Whole convened at the Rome Conference, a 
broad range of State proposals reflected new support for inherent jurisdiction.  For 
example, the German proposal was based upon the logic that universal jurisdiction 
allows individual States to prosecute crimes within the Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the ICC should have the same capacity as a contracting State.175  The 
German delegation vigorously supported universal jurisdiction, noting that under 
current international law all States may already exercise universal jurisdiction for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  Thus, just as any State can 
exercise its own national jurisdiction without consent from either the custodial or 
territorial State, the ICC should be able to do the same.  The Germans observed that 
with regard to genocide, States have frequently exercised universal jurisdiction by 
enacting Statutes, and that extraditions and prosecutions have occurred based upon 
this principle.  Although under Article IV of the Genocide Convention the territorial 
State may be under an obligation to prosecute, the exercise of jurisdiction by other 
                                               
173 Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law Commission, 
Article 22. 
174 Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law Commission, 
Article 22. 
175 Proposal of Germany, A/AC.249/1998/DP.2, 1998. 
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States is not precluded.  With regard to crimes against humanity, the Germans recalled 
that jurisdiction at Nuremberg was based inter alia on the fact that each of the Allied 
Powers could have exercised jurisdiction without an existing territorial or personal 
link.  Many States have enacted Statutes providing for universal jurisdiction over 
these crimes, and the basic human rights that are violated in the context of crimes 
against humanity are of erga omnus character.  Thus, just as third Party States have an 
interest in and a right to bring offenders to justice, so too does the ICC.  Finally, with 
regard to war crimes, the Germans noted that the Geneva Conventions provide that all 
contracting parties are obliged to prosecute individuals who have committed grave 
breaches, regardless of their nationality.  Thus, as they asserted,  
[t]here is no reason why the ICC—established on the basis of a Treaty 
concluded by the largest possible number of States—should not be in the very 
same position to exercise universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes in the same manner as the contracting Parties 
themselves…. By ratifying the Statute of the ICC, the States Parties accept in 
an official and formal manner that the ICC can also exercise criminal 
jurisdiction with regard to these core crimes.  This means that, like the 
Contracting States, the ICC should be competent to prosecute persons which 
[sic] have committed one of these core crimes, regardless of whether the 
territorial State, the custodial State, or any other State has accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court.176 
 
The Germans thus argued that the ICC should hold universal jurisdiction with no need 
for specific State consent.  This proposal received strong support from some 
delegations and many NGOs, who felt that requiring State consent separately from 
ratification of the Statute would inevitably de ract from the Court’s effectiveness.  If 
the German proposal had been accepted, Article 17 would still have mandated that the 
ICC exercise universal jurisdiction only when a national system proved unable or 
unwilling to act.  Therefore, universality wou d not have divested national courts of 
their sovereignty or their primary role in international prosecution.  Rather, universal 
jurisdiction would have granted the ICC jurisdiction over core crimes committed in 
any State, whether or not it was Party to the Statute.  The rights of non-State Parties 
                                               
176 Proposal of Germany. 
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would not have been violated, however, as they would be under no obligation to 
cooperate with the Court. 
Sensing strong opposition to the German proposal from many delegations, the 
Korean proposal instead called for automatic jurisdiction.177  The Koreans argued that 
a State should automatically accept the ICC’s jurisdiction by becoming a Party to the 
Statute.  Under this option one or more of the following States must be Party to the 
Statute in order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction: the territorial State, the custodial 
State, the State of nationality of the accused, or the State of nationality of the victim.  
As the Koreans noted,  
[t]hose who favor the concept of inherent jurisdiction overlook the fact the 
proposed Court is a treaty body to be created through the consent of the States.  
It is State consent that justifies the jurisdictional link between States Parties to 
the Statute and the Court.  Forgoing any precondition to the exercise of 
jurisdiction would run a risk of rendering the acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction meaningless…. The adherents to the State consent regime also fail 
to recognize that the requirement of State consent at two distinct stages—
acceptance and exercise—would render the Court ineffective due to this 
jurisdictional hazard.  For the Court to be as effective as possible, State 
consent should be called for once, when a State becomes party to the Statute.  
Otherwise, it would deprive the Court of the predictability of its function by 
granting States a de facto right of veto to determine whether the Court is able 
to exercise jurisdiction.178 
 
Thus, the Koreans favored a consent regime based upon automatic, but not inherent, 
jurisdiction.  Although the Korean proposal garnered wide support, it proved 
unacceptable to many States who required a second layer of State consent.  These 
States objected that it embodied a type of universal jurisdiction.  Even among those 
preferring inherent jurisdiction, tensions persisted about whether the consent of a non-
Party State should also be required, and if so, whether that State would be the 
territorial, national, or custodial State of the accused. 
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178 Proposal of the Republic of Korea. 
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Alternative proposals indicated persistent concerns about the erosion of State 
sovereignty.  The United Kingdom suggested jurisdiction for the ICC based upon 
territoriality, when both the custodial State and the territorial State consented by 
becoming States Parties to the Statute.179  However, others objected that obtaining 
consent from both these States would be difficult, and the proposal was eventually 
amended by removing the custodial State requirement.  The United States supported 
requiring consent from both the territorial State and the State of nationality of the 
accused in cases where the Security Council did not trigger the Court’s jurisdiction.  
The United States demanded the ICC not hold jurisdiction over nationals of non-
States Parties, and argued that to do otherwise would violate the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.180  However, the American demand for an indispensable 
requirement of consent from the State of nationality of the accused was not shared by 
the overwhelming majority of States, who feared it would potentially paralyze the 
Court.181  An opt-in proposal was also offered.  Before the Court could assume 
jurisdiction, as many as five different States would have to consent, including the 
custodial State, the territorial State, the State that requested the extradition of the 
accused from the custodial State, the State of nationality of the accused, and the State 
of nationality of the victim.  Under this proposal, the ICC would become less 
competent than States to prosecute offenders.  Ratification would mean little as States 
could remove a case from consideration by the Court when politically xpedient.  
Such a proposal could have rendered the Court ineffective in those cases not referred 
by the Security Council. 
The Bureau Discussion Paper and Proposal both narrowed the range of options 
regarding preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, but each adopted a relatively 
cautious approach.  As presented in the Discussion Paper, Article 7 offers various 
options related to State acceptance.  Because it remained undecided whether there 
would ultimately be an opt-in system or automatic jurisdiction, all proposals in Article 
7 require that the relevant States “be a Party to the Statute, or have accepted the 
jurisdiction” in accordance with an opt-in regime.182  The first option, like the Korean 
                                               
179 Proposal of the United Kingdom, A/AC.249/1998/WG.3/DP.1, 1998. 
180 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads, “[a] treaty does not create 
binding obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”
181 Proposal of the United States, A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70, 1998. 
182 Bureau Discussion Paper, Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Applicable Law), Committee of 
the Whole, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an  
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 15 June to 17 July, 1998,  A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53, July 6, 
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Proposal, mandates that in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction, one or more of 
the following States must accept the Court’s jurisdiction: the territorial State, the 
custodial State, the national State of the victim, or the national State of the accused.183  
A more stringent requirement that the territorial State must accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction is presented by the second option.184  The third possibility is even more 
restrictive, requiring that both the territorial State and the custodial State accept the 
Court’s jurisdiction.185  Finally, the fourth option, reflecting a proposal made by the 
United States, requires acceptance from the State of nationality of the accused.186  
With regard to the question of automatic jurisdiction or an opt-i regime, the second 
paragraph of Article 7 favors automatic jurisdiction: “a S ate which becomes a Party 
to the Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.”187  However, it remained 
unresolved whether a State would accept jurisdiction for all core crimes, or simply for 
genocide.  Another option for Article 7 establish d an opt-in regime “for treaty crimes 
and possibly for one or more core crimes,” in which a State could either express its 
consent when becoming a State Party, or at a later time though a declaration.188  The 
declaration could be of a general or limited nature, or could be limited to a specified 
time period.  The Bureau Discussion Paper thus helped frame ensuing debates, but 
genuine willingness to compromise on fundamental issues, especially State 
acceptance of the exercise of jurisdiction, still failed to emerge.  
The Bureau issued a second proposal with alternative options in an effort to 
reach a workable compromise on preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction.189  In 
Article 7, this new proposal separates the preconditions on genocide from those on 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Concerning genocide, the Court could 
exercise its jurisdiction according to the terms of the Korean proposal.190  For crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, three options still remained.  The first is identical to 
the preconditions for genocide.  The second is more restrictive, requiring the consent 
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186 Bureau Discussion Paper, Article 7, Option 4. 
187 Bureau Discussion Paper, Article 7(2). 
188 Bureau Discussion Paper, Article 7(bis). 
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of both the territorial and the custodial State, while the third option, again reflecting a 
United State proposal, simply requires the consent of the State of nationality of the 
accused.191  The debate about automatic jurisdiction versus an opt-in regime was still 
not resolved in the Bureau Proposal, although some progress had been made.  As 
reflected in both alternatives for Article 7 on acceptance of jurisdiction, “a State 
which becomes a Party to the Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the crime of genocide.”192  However, in the first option, a State that 
becomes Party to the Statute thereby accepts ICC jurisdiction over all core crimes, 
thus conferring automatic jurisdiction.193  In contrast, the second option allows for 
States to opt-in through a declaration either at the time of becoming a State Party or at 
a later time, and such a declaration could be of general or limited application, and 
could be made for a specified time period.194   
The compromise position that finally emerged is reflected in Article 12 of the 
Rome Statute, which combines State acceptance of jurisdiction with preconditions for 
the exercise of jurisdiction.  As adopted, Article 12 is not as restrictive as it might 
have been.  The first paragraph of the article outlines that “[a] State which becomes a 
Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court” with respect to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression once 
defined and adopted.195  It therefore confers automatic jurisdiction over core crimes.  
The second paragraph outlines that in cases where a State Party refers a situation to 
the Prosecutor, or when the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio motu, 
State acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by either the territorial State or the State 
of nationality of the accused is necessary.  This provision represents a compromise 
between those who preferred universal jurisdiction or a list of States from which at 
least one must accept the jurisdiction of the Court by ratifying the Statute, versus 
those who preferred acceptance from both the territorial State and the State of 
nationality of the accused.   
Article 12 reduced the pr conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, with a 
jurisdictional nexus based upon either the territorial State or the State of nationality of 
the accused becoming States Parties to the Statute.  The first subparagraph details that 
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the Court may exercis it  jurisdiction based upon consent of the territorial State.  
Territorial jurisdiction is a manifestation of State sovereignty, as a State is granted 
jurisdiction over the persons, property, and conduct inside its territory.  This is a 
universally accept d rule in international criminal law, and was thus accepted as one 
method to allow the ICC to assume jurisdiction.  In exercising its jurisdiction under 
this subparagraph, the Court is not assuming jurisdiction over non-States Parties in 
violation of the Vienna Convention, as the United States has argued.  Rather, an 
individual is potentially held accountable to the jurisdiction of the Court when crimes 
are committed in the territory of a State Party.  Nothing prohibits a State from 
voluntarily delegating to the ICC its sovereign ability to prosecute based upon 
territorial jurisdiction.  The second subparagraph allows the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction with the consent of the State of nationality of the accused.  The third 
paragraph of Article 12 addresses acceptance of jurisdiction by non-States Parties.  It 
provides that if such a State’s consent is required for the Court to exercise jurisdiction, 
that State may declare ad hoc its acceptance for the specific crime.  
Therefore, Article 12 is a product f compromise that allows the Court to 
exercise its jurisdiction subject to specific preconditions without unduly impinging 
upon State sovereignty.  One potential deficiency in this article may be that 
acceptance of the Statute by the custodial State is not a pr co dition to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the ICC.  Such a provision could have ensured that crimes will not go 
unpunished if the territorial State or State of nationality of the accused are not Parties 
to the Statute or do not consent ad hoc, or if there is no Security Council referral.  
Although Article 12 could have been even more restrictive, as adopted it provides the 
Court with less power than either the German or Korean proposal, demonstrating the 
residual desire to place primary authority for criminal prosecution at the national 
level. 
 
Complementarity in Article 13: Trigger Mechanisms 
 The trigger mechanisms for initiating the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction were 
also among the most complex and sensitive issues debated at Rome.196  The primary 
                                               
196 Article 13 reads: The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
Article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:  (a) A situation in which one or more of 
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in 
accordance with Article 14; (b) A situation in which one or more of such crims appears to have been 
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questions to be resolved were the role of the Security Council, the power of States 
Parties to refer a case to the Prosecutor, and the independent authority of the 
Prosecutor to initiate an investigation.  Article 13 is intimately related to Article 12, as 
well as to Article 14 on referral by a State Party, Article 15 on the role of the 
Prosecutor, and Article 16 on the deferral of investigation or prosecution. 
 As demonstrated in the draft Statutes for the ICC, mechanisms for triggering 
the Court’s jurisdiction were highly contested and frequently revised.  The 1994 ILC 
draft affords the Prosecutor no independent powers to begin an investigation, as the 
Statute is geared towards State consent and Security Council control.  The trigger 
mechanism provides inherent jurisdiction only for the crime of genocide.  Moreover, 
only a State Party to the Statute that is also a Contracting Party to the Genocide 
Convention can lodge a complaint regarding genocide.  For all other crimes, a State 
Party must specifically ccept the jurisdiction of the Court through an opt-in scheme 
intended to protect State sovereignty and thereby encourage ratification of the Statute.  
A year later, the Ad Hoc Committee raised a number of concerns regarding the trigger 
mechanisms established in the ILC draft Statute.  Some States suggested that 
complaints concerning genocide should not be limited, while others asserted that only 
States with a direct interest in any given case, specifically the custodial State, 
territorial State, or State of nationality of the victim, should be able to initiate an 
investigation or prosecution.  Moreover, it was in the Ad Hoc Committee that some 
delegations proposed the role of the Prosecutor be expanded to include the right to 
initiate an investigation proprio motu, without State or Security Council referral.  
These same issues over triggering jurisdiction also emerged in the Preparatory 
Committee.  Although support for empowering the Prosecutor with greater 
independence to initiate proceedings had grown, the parameters of such a role were 
undecided.  Additionally, while delegations strongly favored State Party referral of 
cases, they remained divided as to inherent jurisdiction versus opt-i propo als, as 
well as to the role of the Security Council. 
 By 1998, the great majority of delegations at the Rome Conference willingly 
accepted a trigger mechanism allowing States Parties to refer situations.  The 
outstanding issues were the roles of the Prosecutor and the Security Council.  Division 
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persisted on the qustion of granting independent powers to the Prosecutor, although 
the majority favored a proprio motu role subject to certain limitations to prevent 
abuses of power.  Non-g vernmental organizations represented at the Conference also 
believed an independent Prosecutor necessary for an effective Court.  These 
arguments were based upon a suspicion that State complaints and Security Council 
referral might prove insufficient to allow the ICC to operate on behalf of the entire 
international community.  It was feared that without a proprio motu role for the 
Prosecutor, few cases would come before the Court due to the reluctance of States 
Parties to make complaints and the potential for a Security Council veto.  Although 
some States worried about abuses of power from an overzealous or politically 
motivated Prosecutor, these concerns were addressed by limits placed upon the 
Prosecutor in Article 15.   
Agreement in Rome on the role of the Prosecutor grew from the Bureau 
Discussion Paper and Proposals.  In the Discussion Paper, Article 6 includes an option 
for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction when “the Prosecutor has initiated an 
investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with Article 12.”197  Article 12 
permits the Prosecutor to initiate investigations propri  motu, although a prosecution 
can only proceed with the authorization of a pre-trial chamber.198  However, at this 
stage the issue remained unresolved, as another option was the removal of Article 12 
altogether.  Yet the inclusion of these paragraphs, which at least considered a proprio 
motu role for the Prosecutor, indicate a first step towards allowing the Court to 
exercise its jurisdiction more freely.  The subsequent Bureau Proposal expressly 
provides for a proprio motu power for the Prosecutor in At cle 6, which is no longer 
simply an option to be considered but instead a newly incorporated feature.199  
However, Article 12 additionally qualifies that “a provision for additional safeguards 
before the Prosecutor can act” might be necessary in order to ease th  anxieties of 
those States still concerned about granting the Prosecutor such independent 
authority.200  Security Council triggering of ICC jurisdiction also remained a 
contentious issue, as a small but vocal minority of States continued to object to any 
role for the Security Council, arguing it would politicize the Court and undermine its 
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credibility.  These States feared permanent Security Council Members would block 
referrals involving their own nationals or national interests.  Some delegations further 
argued that the Security Council lacked power of referral under the UN Charter.  
However, the majority of States acknowledged the enforcement powers of the 
Security Council under the UN Charter, which under the terms of Article 13 is 
permitted to refer situations to the Prosecutor. 
 Article 13 is a vital component of the system of jurisdiction and 
complementarity of the Rome Statute.  Under this article, the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.  
According to the first paragraph, only States that are Parties to the treaty can refer a 
situation to the Prosecutor and thereby trigger the Court’s jurisdiction.  Non-States 
Parties cannot make d hoc referrals.  The second paragraph outlines the term for 
Security Council referral when it discovers, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.  
The Court will then have jurisdiction over crimes contained within its subject matter
jurisdiction alleged to have been committed in that situation.  As outlined in Article 
12, the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction without the consent of either the territorial 
State or state of nationality of the accused when a situation is referred by the Secu ity
Council.  Security Council referral will also play an important role when crimes have 
allegedly occurred but neither States Parties nor the Prosecutor can initiate 
proceedings under the terms of Article 12(2).  Thus, referral by the Security Council 
will be essential in allowing the Court to exercise its jurisdiction and prevent 
impunity.  Finally, the third paragraph of Article 13 grants the Prosecutor power to 
initiate an investigation pr prio motu.  This provision will also be central to effec iv  
functioning of the ICC by allowing investigations and prosecutions of situations even 
if States fail to refer a case for political reasons.  Article 13 successfully balances 
State sovereignty against the need to create trigger mechanisms that allow the Court to 
prosecute the perpetrators of gross offenses. 
 
Complementarity in Article 17: Issues of Admissibility 
 Issues of admissibility, addressed in Article 17, are the anchor of the Rome 
Statute’s jurisdictional regime.  As reflected in this article, the goal of the Statute is 
clearly not to negate State sovereignty. State concern for sovereign interests was at the 
center of the negotiations surrounding issues of admissibility.  Ultimately, Article 17 
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provides for safeguards that preserve national primacy over jurisdiction, and was thus 
essential for adoption of the Statute. 
 The principle of complementarity is contained in the first two paragraphs of 
Article 17: 
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall 
determine tha  a case is inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction  
over it, unless that State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the     
investigation or prosecution;  
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and 
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State to 
genuinely prosecute.201 
 
This article ensures the Court cannot exercise jurisd ction over a case when a State is 
investigating or prosecuting in good faith, and thereby protects State primacy over 
criminal jurisdiction by assuring that the ICC will only complement such efforts.  
Clearly, Article 17 is intimately connected to paragraph 10 of the preamble, as well as 
Article 1, Article 12 on preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, Article 13 on 
trigger mechanisms, Article 15 on the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor, 
Article 18 on preliminary rulings on admissibility, and Article 19 on challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  Because these jurisdictional principles are so closely 
interrelated, many delegations found it difficult to compromise on any single issue 
without having a clear notion of the final language of the other articles.  Initially, 
however, many States argued that the primary obligation to prosecute belongs to 
States and that the ICC should only act when a national system is unable to investigate 
or prosecute.  Other States and NGOs wanted a more active role for the Court and felt 
the ICC should be able to intervene when a national system is unavailable or national 
proceedings are ineffective. 
 Establishing criteria for admissibility was essential to defining the 
complementary role of the ICC relative to national courts.  The 1994 ILC draft Statute 
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makes clear that the Court is intended to operate where there is no prospect of a trial 
in national courts, which are either unavailable or ineffective.  As such, Article 35 sets 
three grounds for inadmissibility: when the case had been duly investigated by a State 
with jurisdiction and the decision of the State not to proceed to prosecution is well-
founded, when the crime was under investigation by a State with jurisdiction and 
there is no reason f r the Court to take any action with respect to the crime, or when 
the crime is not of such gravity to justify action by the ICC.  These measures were 
intended to assure that the Court would only address cases as outlined in the 
preamble.  In the subsequent Ad Hoc Committee, many delegations noted that 
although the ILC intended for the Court to compliment national jurisdictions, further 
elaboration of the principle of complementarity was needed so that its implications for 
the substantive provisions of the Statute could be fully understood.  The Preparatory 
Committee also recognized that it was crucial to find a proper balance between the 
ICC and national authorities in order for the Statute to be accepted by a large number 
of States.  As a result, Article 15 expands the grounds where the Court can assume 
jurisdiction and introduces the principle of States acting in good faith.  Consensus 
emerged that the Court should determine when a case is inadmissible, and not 
exercise jurisdiction unless States are unable or unwilling to carry out investigations 
and prosecutions. 
 Attaining closure on issues of admissibility was pivotal to adoption of the 
Rome Statute.  Any attempt by a government to weaken complementarity might have 
endangered agreement on the remainder of the Statute and caused the entire 
diplomatic conference to fail.  If Article 17 had been opened for renegotiation and 
substantial changes, the delicate balance based on compromise might well have 
degenerated.  Thus, delegations were encouraged not to revisit the substance of these 
provisions.  Although not all States were completely satisfied by the article, most 
recognized its importance and were willing to accept its terms.  However, delegations 
including China, Egypt, Mexico, Indonesia, India, and Uruguay wanted to reopen 
negotiations.  Thus, the coordinator attempted to resist holding informal consultations, 
fearing they might invite delegations to offer new proposals that could completely 
unravel the principle of complementarity.  Additionally, he believed bilateral contacts 
with delegations would afford a better opportunity to gauge the concerns of those 
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States still opposed to the text.202  Three main complaints with the article surfaced.  
First, some States believed the second paragraph granted the Court too much 
discretion to determine unwillingness, and feared that no objective criteria were 
included to guide the Court.  Secondly, the phrase “undue delay” in the second 
paragraph was determined to be too low a threshold for unwillingness.  Finally, with 
regard to inability, some delegations were concerned that the “partial collapse” of a 
national judicial system was an insufficient basis to allow the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  These delegations argued that it was possible for a national judicial 
system to partially collapse, for example in one region of the country, yet the State 
could still retain the ability to undertake a genuine prosecution. 
 These issues were resolved in the negotiations that followed.  In both the 
Bureau Discussion Paper and the Bureau Proposal, the first concern was met by 
including in the determination of unwillingness the requirement that the proceedings 
violate independence or impartiality as defined “in accordance with the norms of due 
process recognized by international law.”  The language was later refined to read 
“having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law,” and 
inserted into the chapeau to the second paragraph.203  The concern about “undue 
delay” was allayed by replacing “undue” with “unjustified,” thus addressing the fears 
of those delegations not wanting the ICC to act as a Court of review over national 
jurisdictions.  “Unjustified” was viewed as providing for a higher standard than 
“undue,” as “unjustified” implies that a State will have the opportunity to explain any 
delay before the ICC can determine that a case will be admissible.  The issue of 
“partial collapse” proved more difficult.  Although the adjective “partial” did remain 
in the Bureau’s Discussion Paper and Proposal, in the final package presented to the 
Committee of the Whole the wording had been changed to “substantial collapse.” 
 Therefore, complementarity as embodied in Article 17 is the cornerstone of 
the Rome Statute, and balances State sovereignty against the need for an effective and 
viable Court.  Article 17 emphasizes that the ICC is complementary to national 
judicial systems.  Without this article, agreement and compromise would mostly 
likely have been impossible.  The chapeau to Article 17 refers to paragraph ten of the 
preamble as well as to Article 1 of the Statute, although complementarity is most 
                                               
202 Roy S.K.Lee, ed.  The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
Negotiations, Results  (London, UK: Kluwer Law International, 1999) pp. 52-53. 
203 Bureau Discussion Paper pp. 17-19, and Bureau Proposal pp.15-16 
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clearly manifested in the body of Article 17 itself.  The first paragraph of the article 
clearly upholds the primacy of national jurisdictions in outlining the four grounds by 
which the Court is to determine the admissibility of a case.  The first standard is for 
the Court to determine that a crime “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unable or unwilling genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”204  The second criteria of inadmissibility is 
when an offense “has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over the it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, u less that decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”205  
The third ground, which is included in the domestic practice of most States, is that a 
case will be inadmissible “if the person concerned has already been tried for conduct 
which is the subject of the complaint.”206  Finally, a case is inadmissible when it is not 
of “sufficient gravity” to justify action by the ICC.   
The second paragraph of Article 17 addresses the limitations on 
inadmissibility.  In order for the Court to determine unwillingness on the part of a 
State, one of the conditions listed in the subparagraphs must exist.  First, a State will 
be considered unwilling if proceedings are undertaken for the purpose of “shielding 
the person concerned from criminal responsibility.”207  This subparagraph is intended 
to allay the concern that a State might conduct a sham investigation or trial and 
therefore not render genuine justice.  However, it may be extremely difficult for a 
Prosecutor to prove the devious intent of a State under these terms.  Secondly, a State 
will be considered unwilling if there is “an unjustified delay in the proceedings which 
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”208  This offsets the burden of proof placed on the Prosecutor in the first 
subparagraph, but is similarly an attempt to determine the good faith of a State.  
Finally, should the Court determine that “the proceedings were or are not being 
conducted independently or impa t ally, and they were or are being conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice,” the case will be admissible.209  Originally, this clause was 
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thought to relate to inability rather than unwillingness, in the sense that a State could 
not provide for impartial proceedings.  However, during consultations it appeared that 
even where proceedings were not a sham, they could be still be defective in a manner 
indicating unwillingness, such as attempts to cause a mistrial or taint evidence.  As 
such, this paragraph was placed under the definition of unwillingness.   
Finally, in the third paragraph of Article 17, the terms for determining inability 
are defined.  The Court must consider wheth , “due to a total or substantial collapse 
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings.”210  This paragraph was designed to address situations in which the 
collapse of a central government or general chaos due to civil war or natural disaster 
leads to massive public disorder and the inability of a national judicial system to 
function.  Although many components of Article 17 are not as demanding as they 
might have been, it should be noted that the contents of this article were necessary for 
the Statute to be adopted by the great majority of States in Rome.  Article 17 reflects a 
pragmatic compromise negotiated to protect State sovereignty while also creating a 
functional Court. 
 
Conclusion 
 As this analysis of the Rome Statute details, the articles related to jurisdiction 
create a complex and interconnected system in which the principle of 
complementarity is fundamental.  Resolving concerns about the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court, preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, and State 
acceptance of jurisdiction was necessary in order to adopt a Statute with both 
meaningful and functional provisions as well as widspread international support.  
The preamble and Articles 12, 13, and 17, on the preconditions to the exercise of 
jurisdiction, State consent, the trigger mechanisms, and issues of admissibility, 
represent a finely constructed compromise on controversial principle , as can been 
seen in their evolution through past draft Statutes.  Many aspects of these articles have 
been heavily criticized, both for unduly restricting the independence of the Court, and 
conversely for failing to protect traditional notions of State overeignty.  However, by 
constructing a workable regime of complementarity, these articles succeeded in laying 
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the foundation for a Court which has the potential to become an effective tool for 
international justice, while sufficiently protecting State sovereignty in order to foster 
broad support from the international community. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis explores the principle of complementarity in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court as an indicator of a fundamental shift currently occurring 
in international law.  The creation of the Court based upon complementarity reveals 
the potential subordination of an international system prefaced upon State sovereignty 
to a new international system based upon collective interests.  The adoption of t
Rome Statute in 1998 resulted from both a gradual progression towards enforcement 
of evolving international norms, and a unique confluence of political circumstances 
and historical events. The establishment of the Court represents 
the natural culmination of two trends in world politics, one of which began 
late in the nineteenth century and the other after World War II.  The first was 
an increasing recognition of individual human rights as a legitimate subject of 
international law…. The second trend was the creation of a variety of 
international institutions to bring within a more universal and law-like 
framework matters that previously had been left to unilateral state action.211 
 
The complementarity of the ICC signals the beginning of a new era in international 
law, in which shared interests favoring justice for crimes of international concern may 
prevail over traditional notions of State sovereignty.  
The evolution of the complementary jurisdictional regime of the nascent 
International Criminal Court therefor  provides evidence of an emerging post-modern 
international constitutional approach to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. To understand the principle of complementarity and how it embodies this 
shift in the international system, this thesis undertook a detailed analysis of the 
provisions of various draft Statutes and the final Rome Statute.  The Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction, preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, and State acceptance 
of jurisdiction were each examined as direct manifestations of complementarity.  As is 
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evident in the preceding chapters, these three entwined strands of complementarity 
evolved together to create the current regime.  Initially, the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction was highly contested.  States disagreed about what constituted crimes of 
international concern, or even what offenses were widely recognized international 
crimes, and asserted that customary international law was not sufficiently developed 
to guide to the Court.  Over time, shar d norms emerged which defined genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity as gross offenses of concern to the international 
community as a whole, and therefore as worthy of prosecution.  Closely tied to the 
evolution of the provisions on subject matter jurisdiction was the issue of State 
acceptance of jurisdiction.  Initially, the majority of States preferred an opt-in regime 
for all crimes, in which a State, even after becoming Party to the Statute, must still 
grant its specific consent before the Court could assume jurisdiction.  The question of 
which States would need to consent to the Court’s jurisdiction was also fundamental, 
with proposals requiring acceptance by the State of nationality of the accused, State of 
nationality of the victim, territorial State, custodial State, or some combination thereof 
considered at various stages.  However, as the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction was 
narrowed and the importance of international justice for the most serious crimes 
acknowledged, States showed a new willingness to accept automatic jurisdiction, 
initially over genocide only, and later over all core crimes, in order to empower the 
Court to operate where national courts fell short.  Inherent jurisdiction was considered 
essential to safeguard the in erests of the international community and to create a 
viable Court with the support of States Parties.  Similarly, the development of the 
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction indicates that States gradually grew more 
comfortable granting the Court greater independent authority.  In early draft Statutes, 
only States were empowered to bring a case before the Court.  However, as it became 
clear that the ICC could be significantly handicapped by such a restriction and as 
consensus supporting genuine justice surfaced, States proved willing to allow both the 
UN Security Council and an independent Prosecutor to trigger the Court’s 
jurisdiction, subject to restrictions already contained within the Statute regarding 
subject matter jurisdiction and State consent.  Expanding the trigger mechanism was 
deemed necessary to ensure that cases of pressing concern could be brought before the 
Court, even if States proved unwilling to refer such situations for political reasons.  
Complementarity, as expressed in subject matt r jurisdiction, State consent, and the 
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, therefore created a delicate but functional 
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balance between national jurisdiction and international justice.  States still retain 
primacy over the International Criminal Court.  However, as the evolution of 
complementarity suggests, in an international environment increasingly supportive of 
a constitutional and collective approach to serious offenses, many States sacrificed a 
degree of sovereignty in order to create an organ capable of rendering justice at the 
international level. 
Therefore, complementarity as established in the Rome Statute demonstrates 
that the international system is moving beyond preoccupation with State values 
toward protection of human values, that international law is penetrating the shield of 
State sovereignty, and that the international system is developing institutions to 
enforce evolving norms.   Clearly, this process is not complete.  State sovereignty 
continues to be staunchly defended even as it falls under increasing criticism.  The 
refusal of many States to ratify the Rome Statute in order to protect national 
jurisdictions indicates that sovereignty remains a powerful force.  However, this 
struggle over complementarity reveals a major shift in international law, in which an 
international constitutional approach is gaining favor over classical notions of State 
sovereignty.  A foundation of this new perspective rests with the ad hoc ribunals, as 
highlighted by the case of Dusan Tadic before the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY212.  
Despite claims that the primacy of the international tribunal over national courts is 
unjustified and violates State sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, the ruling of the 
Appeal Chamber specifically confirms that authority increasingly resides at the 
international level.  Emphasizing that the crimes within the ICTY’s subject matter 
jurisdiction “do not affect the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of 
mankind,” the Chamber asserted that: 
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, 
should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully 
against human rights.  Borders should not be considered as a shield against the 
reach of the law and as a protection for those who trample underfoot the most 
elementary rights of humanity.213 
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Thus, the Appeal Chamber insisted that the authority to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes rests collectively with the international community, not simply 
with States.  “Any international criminal jurisdiction capable of vindicating the 
interests of the international community necessarily will involve some compromise of 
State sovereignty.”214  Beyond the powerful precedents set by the ad hoc tribunals, the 
establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court further indicates that 
States are no longer the primary layer where public power resides.  Rather, a 
cosmopolitan approach to international justice is clearly evident, as the functions and 
duties of the inter ational community will often be exercised collectively, at the 
international level. 
The principle of complementarity exposes a current challenge confronting 
international law.  States remain a central feature of the international system, and a 
desire to value State sovereignty and national criminal jurisdiction persists.  However, 
the concurrent need to enforce existing norms and establish meaningful collective 
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international concern is clearly evident.  
Complementarity offers an initial response to the question of where authority will 
reside in the evolving international system, and at what level the functions and duties 
of the international community will be exercised.  The successful adoption of the 
Rome Statute for a permanent International Criminal Court based upon 
complementarity indicates a notable shift in the international system.  Authority 
increasingly rests collectively at the international level, rather than nationally with 
States.  An international constitutional approach to the most horrendous crimes in 
international law is emerging, as States recognize their shared interests and sacrifice a 
degree of sovereignty in order to render genuine justice.  By consistently holding 
individuals personally accountable for their actions at an international level, the 
International Criminal Court can begin to heal the wounds of victims by offering a 
measure of justice, and can become an extremely powerful deterrent to the future 
commission of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Collective action 
by a unified community of States can greatly increase the prospects for justice, 
reconciliation, stability, and peace within the international system. 
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